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The aim of this thesis is to develop fact-based arguments on whether the European Court of Justice 
would regard non-recognition and non-enforcement of a foreign retention of title clause by a 
Finnish court as a restriction to the free movement of goods or the free movement of capital. The 
issue is elaborated through a fictional case method between Finland and Germany that reflects an 
earlier case of the ECJ, Krantz. In that case, the Court did not find a restriction to internal market 
as the issue was considered “too remote and indirect” – an expression that might hint for an 
implied de minimis threshold. Consequently, the focus is directed to whether the new 
developments of the Court’s assessment of the free movement provisions might change the way 
a situation that resembles Krantz is seen at the current state of the EU. Is it a hindrance or even 
an obstacle? Or perhaps, could there be a hidden de minimis threshold that the “restriction” at 
hand merely does not meet? 
 
The thesis begins with an introductory chapter, after which it is divided into three parts: two 
premises and their conclusion. The first part focuses on examining why there is a problem, whilst 
exploring the literature written on possible alternatives to the reason of the problem, the lex rei 
sitae rule. Hence, the approach in the second chapter is mostly of private international law. 
Chapters three and four form a whole and continue from what was concluded in chapter two. 
Here, the focus is on internal market law. After this, part two begins and the focus shifts to de 
minimis in the form of the market access test which I see as the most feasible way to include 
proprietary security rights, such as retention of title clauses. The findings here are that there can 
indeed be seen to be different de minimis thresholds even with regard to the internal market 
freedoms, regardless of the ECJ’s express denial. The third part consists of chapters six and seven 
which aim to provide answers to the research questions and thus construe a theory on how the 
fictional case could we resolved by the ECJ at this stage of the EU integration. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHEN PROPERTY LAW ENCOUNTERED 
EUROPEAN UNION INTERNAL MARKET LAW  
 
1.1 Building the base: the players and the playfield 
 
At its core, the European Union is about economy. Even before the EU was a political union, it 
was an economic organization based on facilitating the economic collaboration between its 
Member States. As important as it was for the outer border of the Community to have customs 
control, as crucial it was for its internal market to not have them. As a consequence, four 
fundamental freedoms of the internal market were invented: free movement of goods, services, 
persons and capital. The aim of the new internal market agenda was to facilitate the flow of 
these four factors in order to build a prosperous cross-border economy.  
A well-functioning economy means commercial activity which, for the most part, is dependent 
on acquiring credit. Then again, for one economic actor to extend credit to another economic or 
commercial actor relies largely on security and trust; the likelihood of receiving a repayment 
from the debtor needs to be high. This trust, in turn, lies in the concept of security. A proprietary 
security right is a means to fulfil this trust and security required by those willing to extend credit: 
by agreeing upon an asset as an ‘encumbered asset’ – this asset being subject to a proprietary 
security right – the credit becomes ‘secured credit’, while the creditor receives the qualification 
‘secured creditor’. This way, the payment is secured in case the debtor – the party receiving the 
credit – defaults on payment. The purpose of a secured transaction is that in this case the 
creditor’s claim can be satisfied by the monetary value of the encumbered asset; the debtor loses 
the encumbered asset but the secured claim remains secured: the creditor receives what is hers. 
When the purpose of a secured transaction is fulfilled and the creditor can recover the credit 
with the help of a certain asset agreed upon by the parties to the transaction, legal certainty is 
fulfilled. Trust is protected as both parties know beforehand what is at stake, what the risks are, 
and what will occur in case the risks actualize.1   
                                                 
1 See Juutilainen 2015, pp. 1, 4–10.  
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Hence, proprietary security rights and the proprietary products and instruments being 
encumbered by the creditor serve numerous purposes in an economy: they operate to produce a 
profit, to achieve payment to the benefit of the creditor and work to hold assets and facilitate 
their transfer. Besides, they operate as risk management tools for the creditor.2 A retention of 
title clause is a proprietary security right where the buyer retains the ownership of an object until 
the buyer has fulfilled his obligation to pay the purchase price in full. The retention of ownership 
works as a security for the seller’s right to receive the purchase price for the assets. When the 
payment has been done, the buyer is entitled to the ownership of the object. What makes the use 
of retention of title problematic is that using the device allows the buyer to have the possession 
of the object even when he has not fulfilled his obligation to pay the purchase price.3 
Extending credit promotes the economy in even more ways – ways which resonate with the 
prosperous functioning of the internal market. The ECJ has declared certain national actions as 
incoherent with the proper functioning of the internal market and thus prohibited. It was the 
current Article 34 TFEU, free movement of goods, which attracted special interest from the 
1970's until the early 1990's. According to the Article, both quantitative restrictions and ‘all 
measures having equivalent effect’ (later: MEE) to them were prohibited. First, the Court laid 
down the basic definition of a MEE in Dassonville. The famous clause was as follows: “All 
trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, intra-Community trade, are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”4 
 
1.2 To harmonize or not to harmonize, that is the question 
 
1.3.1 Issue number one: The problem with lex rei sitae 
 
The treatment of foreign proprietary security rights has been investigated by scholars in the 
context of movable property. European legislation has frequently been claimed not to offer 
enough protection when it comes to the problem with valid security rights created in one 
                                                 
2 Dalhuisen 2016, p. 1. 
3 Drobnig – Böger 2015, pp. 241 – 242. 
4 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR 837, para. 5. 
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Member State with regard to a movable object in the situation where this object enters into 
another jurisdiction which, due to different rules on property law, does not recognize or enforce 
the security right created in the previous state. This kind of conduct has been said to wipe out 
the security right validly created in the first Member State or the export country merely because 
of divergences in substantive laws.5 All European countries have adopted the lex rei sitae rule 
as the applicable rule to movable and immovable assets in their region. According to lex rei 
sitae, to any object which is situated within a State's borders, this State's jurisdiction applies. As 
far as immovable objects are concerned, use of the rule is rather unproblematic – a real estate 
is, by definition, something that does not change its location. 6  
On the contrary, when it comes to movable objects, the situation becomes a lot trickier as 
movable objects are indeed movable – their location can be changed from one state to another. 
In the property law context, applying lex rei sitae means that the creation of a security interest 
as well as the insolvency proceedings which take place, should the debtor default his obligation 
to pay, are governed by the law of the original member state (Member State A)7. Hence, the 
questions of what legal rights are recognized under the national legal regime and consequently, 
what the priority order among competing creditors is, are decided and determined under the 
legislation of Member State A. As can be expected, lex rei sitae rarely proves problematic in a 
purely domestic context: the substantive law, according to which the proprietary relation 
between the debtor and the creditor has been created, will equally apply to the enforcement of 
this legal relation and thus satisfy the secured creditor’s claim as intended by the parties. In 
solely national situations, no surprises usually occur. Nevertheless, however simple a 
connecting factor lex rei sitae may appear, it bears a significant drawback: its inflexibility.8  
The inflexible application of lex rei sitae will, however, lead to two different practical problems. 
First, if the assets securing a loan are located in more than one Member State, application of the 
laws of all these jurisdictions would be needed to create the respective security right. This means 
a harsh burden on companies with a broad international business. Second, and even more of a 
                                                 
5 See for example Roth 2008, pp. 37–39.  
6 See, for example, Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, pp. 1–4.  
7 See table 1, page 4. 
8 See Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, pp. 5–6.  
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burden is a situation where the trans-border movement of an asset causes a change in the 
applicable substantive law.9 
This study focuses on the treatment of foreign proprietary security rights in the Member States 
of the EU and specifically the situation brought about by cross-border third-party conflicts 
between competing secured creditors whose habitual residences are in different Member States. 
These situations have been called both conflit mobile and Statutenwechsel, of which I choose to 
use the latter. The Statutenwechsel situation takes place when the statute, in other words the 
substantive law applicable to the legal relation, changes in a way that affects negatively the 
treatment of the encumbered asset. This is because the asset becomes subject to lex rei sitae.10  
In this situation, two legal relations can be separated: the relation between the debtor X and the 
original secured creditor Y, between which the relevant security arrangement has been 
concluded in jurisdiction A [A:SA(x-y)], and the relation between the debtor X and his further 
creditors Z in jurisdiction B, between which additional competing security arrangement has been 
concluded [B:SA(x-z)]. The situation can be illustrated by the following charter made by 
myself:  
 
                                                 
9 Juutilainen 2012, p. 110; Roth 2008, pp. 38–39.  
10 Buure-Hägglund 1978, p. 91; Juutilainen 2015, pp. 211–215. 
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Statutenwechsel situations are always real conflicts – in cases where no relevant differences 
between the competing jurisdictions existed, the situation could not qualify as Statutenwechsel 
in the first place. An explicit example of actual problems caused by the lex rei sitae rule is the 
case with a non-possessory pledge, such as retention of title: a non-possessory pledge validly 
created under the law of Member State A will run the risk of being wiped out when the asset is 
moved to Member State B in case the substantive law of B does not involve a properly 
equivalent security right to the original right and therefore does not recognize and enforce the 
encumbered asset now being governed under that law. Hence, the formerly ultra partes 
enforceable security right – a right with erga omnes, universal effect against the world – 
becomes merely effective inter partes, between the creditor and the debtor and no impact on 
third parties. Here, a connecting factor meant to promote objective legal certainty works in a 
reverse way by producing an outcome of unpredictability and increased risk on the secured 
creditor, as well as a possible loss of validly created proprietary security rights.11 
 
1.1.4 Issue number two: The problems of private international law and the non-acting EU 
 
If the lex rei sitae rule leads in as unpredictable outcomes as the ones mentioned above, why 
has the EU not replaced the rule with another rule or set forth a compromising instrument to 
allocate the negative burden that now lies solely on the foreign creditor? Roth accurately points 
out the passive conduct of the EU in the lack of feasible European legislation in this area.12 One 
could ask: Why has the EU not imposed any significant legislation? 
In fact, it has. The financial collateral directive13 between financial institutions and specific set 
of other public and private parties has been quite successful. The directive harmonizes some 
aspects concerning proprietary security rights, particularly security transfer of ownership, which 
has generally been treated quite differently between Member States14. Article 6(1) of the 
directive sets forth that Member States have to ensure effectiveness of “title transfer financial 
collateral arrangements”. The purpose of this provision is to protect financial collateral 
                                                 
11 See for example Kieninger 1996b, pp. 47–48.  
12 Roth 2008, p. 37–38.  
13 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements, 6 June 2002, OJ 2002 L 
168/43. 
14 See for example Commission Proposal COM(2001) 168 final, p. 3. 
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arrangements concerning title transfer, for example by removing the risk of re-characterizing 
these arrangements as security interests. Moreover, the Directive prescribes application of the 
law of the Member State where the relevant book entry account is maintained (Article 9). Even 
though this Directive does not deal with retention of title clauses, but more “professional” type 
of financial arrangements, it shows a good example of what kind of harmonization could be 
desirable also elsewhere in the field of proprietary security rights. 
What is more, to impose a complete set of rules in the area of European property law may be 
more easily said than it is actually done. All the EU consists of is actually its Member States – 
and what cannot be agreed upon between them, cannot be made into legislation. Directive 
2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating 
late payment in commercial transactions (late payment directive) was to harmonize the third-
party effects of the so called simple retention of title clauses.15 Article 4 (3) of the Directive was 
meant to tackle the problem of non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign retention of title 
clauses, the effect of which would have been better protection of a foreign seller-creditor in a 
debtor’s insolvency proceedings. This is shown in the recital (13) of the draft directive, which 
first prescribes: “The use of retention of title clauses - - is at present constrained by a number of 
differences in national law”, and then continues by stating that “it is necessary to ensure that 
creditors are in a position to exercise the retention of title throughout the Community, using a 
single clause recognized by all Member States.16”  
As the draft directive prescribed, the directive would “provide for the retention of title to be 
enforceable against third parties, even in the case of bankruptcy of the debtor”. The formal 
requirements in Article 4 (1) for a simple retention of title would be moderate, only requiring 
that the clause is to be agreed before delivery of goods and also a one-sided clause by the seller 
would be binding on the buyer, if he does not oppose it. All in all, the purpose was to increase 
foreseeability by facilitating the cross-border use of retention of title clauses – exactly what the 
inflexible use of the lex rei sitae rule sets obstacles to.  
                                                 
15 Commission Amended Proposal COM(1998) 615 final. 
16 The first version of the late payment directive was Parliament and Council Directive 2000/35/EC on combating 
late payment in commercial transactions, 29 June 2000, OJ 2000 L 200/35. The first version was then recast with 
Parliament and Council Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions, 16 February 
2011, OJ 2011 L 48/1. Nevertheless, renewal of the Directive did not change the provision of retention of title.  
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However, the directive did not solve the problem. Due to differences of opinion about the actual 
wording of the Article and because it turned out unclear what the EU’s legislative competence 
in property law was, the final form of the Article 4 became a disappointment17. The current 
formulation does not even mention third-party effects. The final wording is as follows: “Member 
States shall provide in conformity with the applicable national provisions designated by private 
international law that the seller retains title to goods until they are fully paid for if a retention of 
title clause has been expressly agreed between the buyer and the seller before the delivery of the 
goods.”18 Does the wording mean that there is no longer intention in the international level to 
create a common European form of retention of title clauses? 
Some researchers have indeed questioned whether the Article could still have relevance with 
regard to third-party relations, despite the formulation. The Council had based the final non-
harmonization of the Article 4 of the directive on Article 345 TFEU (then 295), according to 
which the Treaty “shall in no way prejudice the rules in member States governing the system of 
property ownership.” According to Milo, the Article does not impose a negative obligation on 
the EU concerning its legislative competence in the field of property law, as almost all EU 
legislation deals with the use of property.19 This argument can be supported with numerous EU 
legislative acts, such as the financial collateral directive. The Court has actually taken a quite 
narrow interpretation of this Article20. There are also judgments given by the ECJ which show 
the EU has competence, when it comes to industrial and commercial property21.  
The case Commission v. Italy in 2006 has, however, somewhat made Milo’s speculations 
irrelevant22. First, according to the Court, the only (express) conclusion to be drawn from the 
provision is that it has effects on the national rules providing a possibility to expressly agree a 
clause on reservation of ownership before delivery of goods, and it is also possible to retain the 
ownership to the goods until the products in question have been paid in full. The Court continued 
by stating that “rules concerning enforceability of retention of title clauses against third parties, 
                                                 
17 Milo 2003, pp. 383–385 and 389–392.  
18 The Directive did not require legislative acts in Finland, since the Finnish legislation already corresponded the 
Directive. See the Finnish Governments Proposal 2001:232, p. 19. 
19 Milo 2003, p. 384. 
20 Weatherill 2006, p. 145. 
21 Milo 2003, p. 384–385. See, for example, C-350/92 Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union, ECR 
1995, I-1985. 
22 Case C-302/05 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic (2006) ECR I-10597. 
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whose rights are not affected by the directive, are still exclusively governed by Member State 
national legal order23.” 
As a consequence, it is very unlikely that a claim about a Member State’s measure violating EU 
law would succeed in the Court, if it is based on the Article 4 of the late payment directive. In 
fact, there is a case based on Article 4 of the late payment directive: Commission v. Italian 
Republic.24. However, the Court merely confirmed here the interpretation that Article 4 does not 
regulate third-party effects of a retention of title clause25. Nevertheless, this leaves open the 
possibility to research the applicability of the basic market freedoms, here being the free 
movement of goods and capital, since they are (possibly) applicable when there is no 
harmonization on the measure26. 
 
1.2 Research questions and delimitations 
 
This theme as itself is not exactly new as the issue has been discussed in literature. Still, 
however, I dare to claim that there is an area which none of them has quite touched yet. No 
researcher has yet structured a comparative case scenario to test an a priori hypothesis against 
the EU free movement background. First of all, most of the previously mentioned researchers 
have had free movement of goods as their theoretical framework. I will, too, use this freedom, 
but more as a means of existing doctrinal support for extending the investigation to the Article 
63 TFEU, free movement of capital. Capital may not be as straightforward a basic freedom as 
concrete goods and their free movement when it comes to setting a positive hypothesis and 
finding the right tool to test it, which sets its own challenges. Nevertheless, the context of capital 
is less studied and allows the research to take on a more up-to-date path. Second, the existing 
line of research still has not managed to give a satisfactory answer or solution to the problem at 
hand. If anything, this should prove the need for further research. 
                                                 
23 Commission v. Italy, paras 29–30.  
24 Case C-302/05 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic (2006) ECR I-10599. 
25 The judgment, paras. 29–31.  
26 See for example case C-95/14 Unione Nazionale Industria Conciaria (UNIC) and Unione Nazionale dei 
Consumatori di Prodotti in Pelle, Materie Concianti, Accessori e Componenti (Uni.co.pel) ECR I-492, para. 33. 
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My research question is whether the combined effect of conflict rules and substantial law would, 
de facto, result in an infringement of free movement of capital within the internal market of the 
EU in a situation where a foreign retention of title clause is not recognized and enforced in 
Finland. I will seek to answer the ultimate question: How would this cross-border problem be 
solved and the question of whether it constitutes a restriction to free movement of capital, be 
answered, should it come before the ECJ in the current state of EU law? By doing this, I will 
employ the market access test as a de minimis threshold used by the ECJ, since it appears to be 
the most feasible approach to include the national treatment of foreign proprietary security rights 
into the scope of the free movement Articles.  
The context of private international law and problems caused to cross-border players due to 
divergent substantive laws of EU Member States might tempt one to doubt the very questions 
set forth in this thesis: why would cross-border creditors even mind the Statutenwechsel issue 
since, after all, they have arbitration as an option? In arbitration, the parties to a security 
arrangement could affect who the arbitrators will be and this way the adjudicators might also be 
more preferable towards what is good for this party. Furthermore, one could think choice-of-
law options to considerably diminish Statutenwechsel problems – if the parties choose the law 
of the export country to govern their relationship in case the relationship for some reason 
exceeds over the borders, should they not end up being adjudicated by this law? After all, should 
economic actors not at least be aware of this option? 
Indeed, another important delimitation in this thesis is that arbitral tribunals or other alternative 
dispute resolution methods will explicitly be excluded from the scope of study. This is because 
the EU is sui generis by nature – an exceptional and unique entity among sovereign states and 
international organizations and hence neither equivalent to an international organization nor a 
federal state. Moreover, the EU law itself only sets obligations to sovereign states, which, in 
turn, have given the EU the very mandate to do this by becoming member states of the EU. 
Against this background, only relevant courts with regard to EU law are those courts in the 
Member States which use public power and therefore are also eligible to refer preliminary 
questions to the ECJ. Arbitration, on the other hand, is only feasible in disputes between private 
parties and specifically in dispositive disputes – disputes in which the parties can by nature of 
the dispute reach a consensus by themselves. Indispositive matters, in turn, do not include this 
 10 
 
option. They are not disputes in which the parties could reach an agreement, but require an 
objective “mouth of the law” as a result of the public element involved in the circumstances. In 
addition, the nature of property law can be described by its mandatory nature which is often 
referred to as a form of the state’s public policy – this is where the principle of numerus clausus, 
concept of property law as a nationally closed system, becomes relevant. Numerus clausus will 
be further elaborated in the section 2.1.  
The EU regulation on insolvency proceedings27 is not applicable to my theme of research and 
is thus outside the scope of this thesis. Koulu, Herchen, Virgós, Garcimartín and Juutilainen are 
all of the opinion that questions on if a certain object belongs to the debtor, is not an issue of 
insolvency law28. The same applies to third-party effects of retention of title clauses29. Virgós 
and Garcimartin have argued that the question of whether a foreign retention of title is binding 
on third persons, such as the debtor’s other creditors, is of preliminary character in relation to 
questions regulated in the Regulation – each Member State applies its own conflict of laws rules 
to this preliminary question30. According to Herchen, existence of the property rights meant in 
Articles 5(1) and 7(1) of the Regulation is not a question of property law, but an issue to be 
solved in accordance with rules of private international law31. 
Despite the applicable substantive law, the relevant conflict rules are also objective and 
mandatory. Like rules on property law, they are also often considered rules of public policy. 
When substantive law is mandatory, it is out of the reach of the parties’ stipulations: they cannot 
decide by themselves under which conditions the agreement will be enforceable against third 
parties. This includes the preconditions for the arrangement to become effective, which usually 
manifest as publicity and specificity requirements. These active requirements and passive 
restrictions being laid down by law makes it legally impossible for the parties to deviate from 
them by stipulating otherwise. The same applies to the objective connecting factors of conflict 
rules:  parties to a security agreement cannot deviate from them either. Instead, the applicable 
                                                 
27 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast). 
28 Koulu 2002, pp. 152–153.  
29 Juutilainen 2005, p. 42. 
30 Virgós – Garcimartín 2004, pp. 69 – 70. 
31 Herchen 2000, p. 55. 
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substantive law governing third-party conflicts is determined on objective grounds, such as lex 
rei sitae which, as explained above, prescribes the law of the asset’s location to apply.32 
Although some research has already been done on this theme, it has been either cautious or too 
optimistic and straightforward. Some scholars have all ended up considering the non-
recognition and non-enforcement of foreign proprietary security rights as an infringement of 
either Article 34 or Article 63 TFEU. However, I see that they have reached their conclusions a 
bit too fast. To argument on something a priori, before and thus without actual empirical data, 
is a difficult task. Only time will show, how the ECJ will eventually resolve this issue. Until 
then, there is room for interpretation and analogies from existing case law as well as from a 
source well known for the EU: the Member State's legal doctrine33.  
However, I find that the value which elaborating this issue brings to the EU legal research is 
mainly theoretical in the current state of the EU integration, since the EU does not seem to be 
planning on harmonizing the third-party effects of retention of title clauses within the Member 
States in the near future regardless of its earlier good intentions. Nevertheless, this does not 
change my view that harmonization should ultimately be the solution, be it through piecemeal, 
partial or more comprehensive means.34 
 
1.3 Something old, something new and a hint of fiction: the research method 
 
As a method outline, I will combine legal comparison to the aspects of traditional legal 
dogmatics and a fictional case method. Legal docmatics aims to provide arguments on the status 
quo of the law through systematization, interpretation and balancing of legal sources. De lege 
                                                 
32 Van Erp 2008, p. 11; Juutilainen 2015, p. 8–9, 193.  
33 Gless – Martin 2013, pp. 37–38.  
34 For what kind of means would be the most desirable for the harmonization development, see Juutilainen 2015. 
Juutilainen has divided alternative approaches to four categories, the three of which – centraliced conflicts-
approach, and the local substantive approach and the local conflicts-approach – work as an antithesis for the thesis, 
centralized substantive approach that is the most comprehensive integration method. Juutilainen ends up proposing 
a so called integrated approach which aims to combine the useful and feasible parts of each approach, whilst 
avoiding their drawbacks. See Juutilainen 2015, pp. 35–84.  
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lata, which goes hand in hand with legal docmatics, provides recommendations of interpretation 
based on these legal sources. My findings in the following chapters will mostly be de lege lata.35 
 Legal comparison aims to structure a frame inside of which the researcher can as objectively as 
possible examine the chosen jurisdictions. It is essential to set the same frame for all jurisdictions 
involved.36 The interest lies in how and to what extent the characteristics of other jurisdictions 
can be brought into the comparer’s own legal system.37 I have sought to do this task by 
elaborating the property law aspects concerning the use of retention of title in Finland and 
Germany and comparing them. Moreover, I have included relevant case law from Denmark and 
Sweden, since as other Nordic Member States of the EU, they can give valuable insight into 
how certain issues could be resolved in Finland. This is due to the close proximity of the selected 
countries’ legal culture. 38 My tertium comparationis – the instrument against which legal 
systems are compared – is how these legal systems have resolved the situation of a national 
court encountering a foreign non-possessory security right which it does not recognize39. 
The legal comparison used in this thesis works on three levels. The first level comparison is not 
very systemic, but seeks to find differences and models to develop one’s own legal system. This 
model rarely includes a deeper examination of the foreign system. The second level comparison 
is the closest to my fictional case method: it can be characterized as a harmonization interest 
that seeks for the most workable solution for a legal problem mutual to several different 
jurisdictions. The second level comparison requires an objective instrument, concept or question 
against which the jurisdictions in question are analyzed. For me, this consists of both my tertium 
comparationis and the more general research question of a possible trade barrier within the 
internal market of the EU when a foreign – usually German – retention of title right is not 
                                                 
35 Kolehmainen 2015, pp. 2–3.  
36 Husa 2010, p. 707.  
37 Herala – Hyyryläinen 2001, p. 16. 
38 See “Ruotsi – oikeudellisia tiedonlähteitä”. 
39 See Hautamäki 2003, p. 109.  
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recognized. 40 One of my catalysators to use legal comparison is the dynamic nature of EU law 
– it is not only Finland, but also the EU itself that takes inspiration from its Member States.41 
A complete, all-covering research on the topic of proprietary security rights and free movement 
of capital would be impossible to handle in the a master's thesis. To make this study as feasible 
as possible, I will realize it through a fictional case. This hypothetical scenario will be carried 
through this thesis as a concrete mirror for theories and already existing cases of both the ECJ 
and selected national courts. Finally, this case will be solved as it could be solved, should it 
come before the ECJ in the current state of EU law. By this, I will seek to set a specific factual-
legal framework for my thesis. The case,“Y GmbH against Finland” is as follows:  
Y GmbH is a German sawmill company whose main business is to manufacture log handling machines 
required in the sawmill industry as well as sell and deliver them for recognized retailers in the Eastern 
Europe and the Nordic countries. Y GmbH has entered into an agreement SA (x-y)42 with a Finnish retailer 
X Oy on selling and delivering a sophisticated log handling machine to Finland.  The parties have also 
agreed that the delivery would include other machines that X Oy has bought (and paid) from another 
German company, but which are yet to be delivered to Finland. As is a common practice among Y GmbH 
and its competitors throughout Central Europe, the agreement includes a retention of title clause, according 
to which Y GmbH shall reserve himself ownership of the product until he has received full payment of the 
purchase price from X Oy, but X Oy is nevertheless entitled to re-sell the item once he has acquired the 
possession of it43. The clause is created under German law. The parties have agreed that the purchase price 
will be paid after the machines have been delivered. Later on, X Oy sells the items further to its Finnish 
retailers, but with a Finnish retention of title clause. 
However, soon after this and before the newly sold items have been delivered further, Finnish Tax 
Authorities seize all the delivered objects, including the machines with a retention of title clause. X Oy 
has been declared insolvent, in which situation his debts can be seized from his property. Here, the Tax 
                                                 
40This thesis includes some elements of the so called third level legal comparison in which the researcher seeks for 
differences in a certain legal field, such as property law. Here, the objective is often normative and close to legal 
dogmatic. However, the second and third level are like different sides of the same method – one is almost 
impossible to separate from the other. See Husa 2010, pp. 715–716.  
41 This is conducted through systematic and teleological interpretation of EU law. See Streinz 2014, pp. 161 – 163; 
Weatherill 2006, pp. 144 – 149.  
42 A security agreement between Y GmbH and X Oy; even though the agreement deals with a sale, it is construed 
through a retention of title clause, which can be seen as and which I indeed consider, a non-possessory pledge. This 
complies with a modern view of property law as opposed to the traditional view, in which a security ownership 
was considered fragmented and met with suspicion. See van Erp 2008, p. 21. 
43 This is a so called extended retention of title clause (verlängerter Eigentumsvorbehalt). See chapter 2.2.2. 
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Authorities have a priority against private debts. Y GmbH objects to the seizure as, due to the clause, the 
machine belongs to him.  
At this point, X Oy has still not paid the purchase price to Y GmbH. Y GmbH sues X Oy in a Finnish District 
Court, arguing that his rights have been breached. Because of the lex rei sitae rule, Finnish law applies. 
The District Court rules the case in favor of X Oy. This is because it has not recognized the retention of 
title clause in question as valid and binding even after it transformed the foreign retention of title clause 
into a Finnish equivalent. The case is later brought before the European Court of Justice in a preliminary 
ruling procedure. Y GmbH argues that the seizure by Finnish authorities and the non-recognition of the 
German right violates the free movement of goods and capital stated in the TFEU. 
This case is fictional. However, it contains some key elements similar to both a Finnish Supreme 
Court case KKO 1990:104 (see Chapter 2), Swedish Supreme Court case NJA 1978 p. 593 and 
case Krantz (C-69/88; see Chapter 3), which can be seen as the only case of the Court that deals 
with movable property and free movement, even though Krantz dealt with Germany and the 
Netherlands. However, the Court somewhat still left the question of whether this violation of 
the buyer’s rights constituted an obstacle to free movement of goods (Article 34 THEU) 
unanswered. Consequently, I will seek to mirror a case close to Krantz against the more recent 
developments of European law, particularly market access test. Could it be that in other 
circumstances, with more academic discussion supporting it and with actually examining the 
subject rather than merely dismissing it, a similar enough situation could actually be that 
pioneering case the Court is yet to decide? 
A fictional case method is a new approach to legal research on EU law44. It contains elements 
from more traditional case analyses where an already existing case is interpreted – a method 
widely used in European legal research. This is well-reasoned against the background that EU 
law is largely developed through case law, which gives EU law its dynamic character: new 
interpretations modifying how the existing legislation is to be seen and applied are born from 
factual scenarios with EU law connections. In a way, employing cases as a part of one’s 
methodology can therefore be seen to embrace the core nature of what EU law is. I find that the 
fictional case method is the best way to make use of this potential particularly with a topic that 
                                                 
44 The method has been more in use in the Unites States (see for example Burnham 1987) and in the United 
Kingdom (see for example Hodgson 1995), where common law legal culture gives more weight on case law. 
However, it has also been used by European legal writers – see, for example,Yates 1975 for French perspective on 
international law and Smet 2013 on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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elaborates on how an issue with connections to three fields of law – EU law, private international 
law and property law – could be resolved by the ECJ. 45 
It is to be noted that the interest of knowledge of this thesis is mostly theoretical in that it focuses 
on the obvious gap in the harmonization of private law. The case is exceptional and does not 
reflect what I see would be the usual relation with non-possessory security rights and the free 
movement Articles. Most relevant proprietary security rights are either used in connection with 
sophisticated financial intermediaries, are in the scope of lex registrationis or simply belong to 
the area of contract law, in which case there is no mandatorily applicable numerus clausus 
regime of the host State or unexpected loss of rights due to Statutenwechsel.46 
Even though there is no directly applicable case law of the ECJ and some scholars only consider 
this issue a theoretical possibility47, I have the following argument: There are valid grounds to 
consider that non-recognition and non-enforcement of rights derived from foreign retention of 
title clause in another Member State can constitute a trade barrier either in meaning of Article 
34 or 63 TFEU. In short, my hypothesis is that the free movement of capital could de facto be 
under an infringement, in factual circumstances similar to my hypothetical facts. This claim, 
which will be tested  is mainly supported by the combined effect of arguments presented in 
European legal literature, the opinion of AG Darmon in case Krantz and the dynamic 
development of EU law, which constitute the valid reasons mentioned above.48 
However, I assume that this infringement would not be of the severity required by the ECJ in its 
case law to actually reach the considerably high threshold of a trade barrier described in either 
Article 34 or 63 TFEU. In other words, I expect that existence of a limitation to cross-border 
trade would be present, but it would not be of the severity required for it to actually constitute a 
breach of the Treaty.  First, the following prerequisites need to be accepted: 
                                                 
45 Actually, there is hardly a “European” legal method in EU scholarship, at least so far. Without an exclusive EU 
method, all research more or less reflects the writer’s national idea of legal methodology. However, a way to make 
one’s method more “European” in a doctrinal study has been to use the methods of the ECJ in their writing. Van 
Gestel and Micklitz have nevertheless criticized this approach, since it easily makes a scholar part of a herd that is 
blind for criticism of the Court. In a way, my fictional case method seeks to answer the writers’ inquiry for a fresher, 
more independent way of doing European legal research. See van Gestel – Micklitz 2014, pp. 297, 299, 307, 314. 
46 See for example Dalhuisen 2016, pp. 183–315, where Dalhuisen goes through modern financial products, such 
as floating charges, receivable financing, finance lease and futures. 
47 Juutilainen 2005, p. 71. 
48 See Svinhufvud 2015, p. 130–133. The term a priori refers to purely rational conclusions. Since the ECJ is yet 
to give an applicable ruling of my research question, the direction of this thesis is essentially theoretical.  
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1. The academic doctrine on the Statutenwechsel problem in connection with foreign security 
rights entering another Member State, which has been applied to free movement of goods, 
can be seen to apply equally to free movement of capital, i.e. Article 63 TFEU; 
2. As an implied threshold woven in the market access test, a de minimis threshold exists with 
regard to retention of title clauses’ access to the receiving Member State’s market. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
 
A classical way to structure an accurate conclusion is to follow the model of a logical syllogism, 
a form of deductive argumentation where the conclusion necessarily follows from certain 
premises  as prerequisites for the conclusion to be logically true. A typical example is as follows: 
If A is B and B is C, then A is C. The facts which form the second premise can be at least legally 
interpreted to actualize the deed described in the legal rule, or for example fulfil the requirements 
stated in the rule. Sometimes the relevant legal rule is in a written form, as is the usual case in 
civil law countries and in the EU, but it may also be a preliminary ruling, to which the factual 
situation at hand is compared. When the relevant legal rule, the first premise, is a preliminary 
ruling, its facts are of most importance – if the facts are similar to the facts in the leading case, 
the legal rule in the preliminary ruling called ratio decidendi49 applies. The more different the 
facts in the present case are to the facts in the preliminary ruling, the more difficult it is for a 
correlation to take place and the preliminary ruling to apply to the present case.50 
I have chosen to divide my thesis into three parts to fit into the model of logical syllogism. 
Hence, part I and II will, in a way, work as premises 1 and 2, from which the conclusion, part 
III, will logically follow. Part I will test the first theory. It will deal with the pre-research 
                                                 
49 Szabados 2015, p. 125. 
50 Deductive logic is the most prominent form of justification by inference, which means justification of something 
that has, in away, already been accepted. In deductive reasoning, the conclusion is implicitly visible in the premises 
themselves. However, this thesis will substantially deal with justification by argument which is substantially the 
same, but with a focus on the substance – this form of justification aims to achieve a certain conclusion based on 
arguments presented before (Kloosterhuis 2013, p. 71 and Sieckmann 2013, pp. 196–197). This makes sense, since 
legal reasoning is not a mathematical task, but requires balancing of interests and interpretation of existing law, the 
use of “creative intuity” (Novak 2013, p. 156). The distinction between deductive argumentation and more difficult, 
constructive and creative argumentation becomes clear when a case is a so called hard case. Here, chosen 
argumentation – and not the already existing premises – determines the legal consequences of a decision. See Hage 
2013, p. 126. 
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question of which doctrine of EU internal market law should be followed with regard to 
proprietary security rights. Is it the free movement of goods and Keck or market access doctrine, 
these two combined or perhaps something else? This investigation will be compulsory in order 
to give a conclusion that is at least to some extent satisfactory, but it will set its own challenges 
as the tests and doctrines applied to one freedom by the ECJ will not automatically be equally 
applicable to the others. The first part will thus work as an ontological prerequisite for the second 
part, seeking to find whether this kind of threshold could, in the first place, exist within the 
defined area of research. After the first part, the second question can be asked. What follows in 
the part II, is the focus on de minimis and its concrete application: could market access test have 
a certain threshold or thresholds, some kind of de minimis border, so that prima facie prohibited 
national measures would nevertheless be allowed? Here, market access test and the possibility 
of expanding the application of de minimis rule from competition law to free movement law will 
be investigated.  
However, this investigation will be limited to the context of European cross-border secured 
credit with regard to movable objects. If the test is seen to have this kind of de minimis threshold, 
do the restrictions on free movement caused by the national treatment of foreign proprietary 
security rights, however, fall under this threshold? If this is true, these national measures would 
not constitute a hindrance to internal trade, at least according to the ECJ. Was this the case, the 
measures would not substantially restrict marketing practices within the union. Then again, in 
case the answer was negative so that the effects these national measures had on internal trade 
did not fall under the de minimis threshold, these national measures would be interpreted to 
actually hinder trade in the internal market of the EU. The final part will be the conclusion and 
will seek to define the threshold with regard to my fictional case.  
One of my aims in this thesis is to structure a case scenario and thus be able to answer certain 
substantive legal questions. In a way, the decision to divide this study into three parts will seek 
to fit together with this previously mentioned aim: to structure a legal ruling classically involves 
two premises and a conclusion brought about by the premises. At its core, this is also what my 
thesis is about: to construe a theory on how the ECJ might resolve this issue – when the Court 
ultimately delivers a ruling, it will follow the deductive model of a logical syllogism.51 
                                                 
51 Novak 2013, p. 158, Bobek 2015, pp. 169–172; Sieckmann 2013, pp. 189–190, 195–199.  
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PART I 
”It cannot be denied any longer, but has, on the contrary, been plainly confirmed now, that divergences in the 
property law on contractual security rights in movables are, indeed, an obstacle to the proper functioning of the 
internal market in the European Union.”52  
 
2. PRELIMINARY ISSUES: QUESTIONING THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF A FREE 
MOVEMENT BREACH  
 
2.1 Numerus clausus as the access test to national property law 
 
2.1.1 The situation of “Y GmbH vs. Finland” as a starting point 
 
As is evident in my fictional case, the legal regime in Finland, treats the proprietary security 
right at hand, a more advanced type of retention of title clause from Germany in a more 
unfavorable way than national retention of title clauses and other proprietary security rights 
which have the same aim and purpose. In the case, the substantial legislation of Finland treats 
products, here being retention of title clauses of foreign and national origin in a formally equal 
way. Hence, the discrimination, which Y GmbH claims is taking place, cannot be direct. 
However, the claimant Y GmbH states, the national treatment applied by Finland to the 
established retention of title clause, hinders the imported product, the foreign security right, 
purposefully accessing the market of Finland. This hindrance is brought about by Finland not 
recognizing and enforcing the security right created under the laws of Germany; the legal form 
given to the right by the national court does not correspond the substance of the transaction and 
the parties’ purposes when establishing the right.  
In “Y GmbH against Finland”, Finland intends to transpose  the security right into a better 
known and recognized security right. Nevertheless, this does not help the claimant’s case: it 
only leads to an unfavorable outcome to the claimant as transposition is not complete. The 
                                                 
52 Drognig – Snijders – Zippro 2006, p. 12. 
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numerus clausus of Finland simply does not offer adequate means to reconstruct the security 
right at hand as it does not know an extended retention of title clause unlike the German law. 
According to a strict property law system, such as the Netherlands and Finland, the manufacturer 
of a new product is considered the owner of this product. The same applies to situations where 
the original buyer is entitled to re-sell the product to his own retailers or customers. The 
conclusion is that the German seller Y GmbH loses his right to the product.53  
 
2.1.2 Numerus clausus: the access test to national property law 
 
Verstijlen has argued that there are three ways to divide the diverging legal systems in the EU. 
The first divide is between jurisdictions which recognize a specific closed list of property rights, 
the principle of numerus clausus, and jurisdictions which do not.54 Property law rules can be 
considered to constitute a set of mandatory rules (ordre public). A legal relation cannot receive 
the effects of a property law relation in a certain jurisdiction if it does not fulfil the requirements 
of the specified numerus clausus system in that legal regime. The numerus clausus regime of a 
state offers private parties a set of property rights from which to choose from. The parties must 
however make this decision in accordance with the mandatory rules of national property law.55  
Numeral clausus works to restrict the amount of possible encumbrances and burdens which 
could hinder its free transferability. It can be described as an access test to the domestic property 
law regime. It divides the boundaries between the rights that belong to property law, which is 
part of national public policy, and to those that only belong to the law of obligations which, 
instead, does not have public elements.56 One of the reasons behind the principle is protection 
of third parties, to whom recognizing new property rights would cause unacceptable information 
                                                 
53 Ramaekers 2013, pp. 6–8. According to the respondent in the case, the claimant – Y GmbH – simply should 
have opted for another form (and content) when establishing the proprietary security right so that it would fit better 
into other jurisdictions and avoid problems of recognizing it as merely a contractual type of sale. After all, the 
claimant should have known that as a movable object, the encumbered assets might change their location over the 
course of time and hence, insolvency proceedings might take place somewhere else than within the original 
jurisdiction. Hence, the claimant should have relied on a more predictable form of security than retention of title 
clause.  
54 Verstijlen 2006, pp. 18–19.  
55 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 4. 
56 Akkermans 2008, p. 490. 
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costs.57 It is significant that even with the same aim, the list is different within the Member 
States of the EU. For example, German law accepts a much wider catalogue of rights than the 
Nordic systems.58 EU law can also be seen to form its own numerus clausus.59 
It is significant here that retention of title and other ownership-based security rights are not 
classified in all Member States as security rights. Instead, some jurisdictions categorize them as 
functional equivalents of pledges or as quasi-security rights. Nevertheless, the European 
discussion has generally seen them as security rights, since their functions and economic 
objectives are similar to the so called genuine forms of pledge.60 
 
2.1.3 Principle of ordre public – What is it and why is it relevant here? 
 
Ordre public is a principle that refers to the use of public policy by a national court. It can be 
described as a principle of absolution61. When applying this principle, a national court rejects 
application of the law of the jurisdiction which should be applied according to the rules of 
private international law, i.e. lex causae. In general, it is only acceptable to rely on ordre public 
when application of a foreign law would collide with the fundamental values of the jurisdiction 
in which the case is being settled, i.e. forum domicilii. After application of the ordre public 
principle, a national court usually applies its own law, lex fori. However, it is exceptional to use 
ordre public, and thus, the court must always give a proper reasoning for its decision to use it.62 
Ordre public, or public policy, is applicable even when there is no actual provision of written 
law. Ordre public is very similar to the concept of mandatory rules that are to be applied directly 
no matter what rules would otherwise become applicable as lex causae. Mandatory rules are to 
be interpreted strictly. This means that only a provision, the objectives of which require it to be 
applied also to cross-border situations. For example, for a Finnish court, mandatory rules include 
restrictions on import and export, public order and safety as well as provisions on competition 
                                                 
57 Akkermans 2008, pp. 445–446, 555. 
58 Akkermans 2008, pp. 482–487.  
59 Akkermans 2008, p. 553. 
60 Juutilainen 2010, p. 15. 
61 Koulu 2005, p. 53; Koulu uses a Finnish word “ehdottomuusperiaate”. 
62 Koulu 2005, pp. 53–54.  
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law. Naturally, rules of the EU competition law are also relevant here.63 Of these sets of 
mandatory rules, rules relating to EU free movement law – rules of restrictions on imports and 
exports – and EU competition law are the most relevant for this thesis, which I will revert to 
later on. Concepts of ordre public however differ from one another in the way that ordre public 
relates more to the ethical principles valuable to that jurisdiction, whereas mandatory rules have 
more to do with public interest, such as fiscal, social and political objectives.64 
Ordre public has traditionally been regarded as the final means, ultima ratio, for the national 
court. The court settling a case cannot rely on ordre public in an arbitrary manner. It is a right, 
not an obligation. When a national court is considering whether to apply the ordre public 
principle, it needs to assess it solely based on the (fictional) outcome of applying the foreign 
rule or, as in my hypothetical case, recognizing the foreign proprietary security right as itself. 
The court has to arrive at a fictional, substantial outcome and then compare it to the outcome it 
would have arrived at based on lex fori. What this means is that the court cannot discriminate a 
foreign institute, rule or legal entity merely because it considers it unfair, unjust or unethical for 
its national jurisdiction.65 
Consequently, when the national court considers that the dispute at hand contains elements 
relating to its public policy, it can, at least theoretically, apply the principle of ordre public and 
not apply a foreign law, but its own. In Finland, situations to apply ordre public have usually 
been divided into those in which the foreign entity is against fundamental human rights, where 
it infringes the procedural principles that support the material outcome, where the material 
objectives of Finnish jurisdiction are in jeopardy and the situations in which the application of 
foreign law could be in breach with principles of European law. However, the national court can 
embrace the principle of ordre public only if application of the foreign legal entity is in breach 
with EU free movement law, such as Articles 34 and 63 TFEU.66 
For the measure to be justifiable in accordance with Article 36 TFEU, one of the grounds stated 
in the Article must be present – and one of these grounds happens to be public policy.67 It is to 
                                                 
63 Koulu 2005, p. 27 and 30. 
64 Koulu 2005, p. 102. 
65 Koulu 2005, pp. 105–106.  
66 Koulu 2005, p. 106. However, this is kind of the opposite of the situation focused on in this thesis. 
67 See for example Leeuwen 2017, pp. 254–257. Public policy is a significant ground for justification in situations, 
where the national legislations differ across Europe due to lack of harmonization. For example, case C-470/11 SIA 
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be noted that national rules of property law constitute a set of mandatory rules. According to 
Akkermans and Ramaekers, it follows from national property law rules being of mandatory 
character that these property rules are, in fact, rules that belong to public policy, ordre public.68 
Roth has taken the same approach69. If this presumption is taken seriously, it may have quite 
significant consequences. As it is, even if a national measure falls within the scope of either 
Article 34 or 63 TFEU, there is Articles 36 and 65 TFEU which may justify the measure. 
National public policy protects values, such as transparency of security transactions, registration 
requirements and confidence of third parties, which may qualify as justifiable grounds. The 
same applies with provisions on priority order among competing creditors, which is closely 
connected with the economic order of a member State.70 
Before questions of justifying the national measure – which, as itself, already includes the notion 
that this kind of measure actually can constitute a measure of equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions in accordance with Article 34 TFEU71 – certain preliminary questions need to be 
investigated with regard to how the host state actually treats the foreign right. 
 
2.2 Retention of title and its effects against third parties– legal classification and extent in 
chosen jurisdictions 
 
2.2.1 On the nature of property law in private international law 
 
As has been stated previously, the provisions of substantive law regarding retention of title and 
its nature as a security instrument diverge remarkably across the EU. Whereas in some Member 
States, a fiduciary transfer of movable property is given ultra partes effect towards third persons 
even when a transfer of possession does not take place simultaneously, this is not the case in all 
Member States. What is clear is that every EU Member State does recognize a reservation of 
                                                 
Garkalns v. Rigas dome (2012) demonstrated the national court’s broad discretion to refuse authorization to open 
a gambling place, such as a casino, based on moral values respected in that country. The freedoms to provide 
services was overrun by the public policy justification that was not unproportionate.  
68 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 4. 
69 Roth 2008, p. 52. 
70 Roth 2008, p. 52–53.  
71 This theme of EU internal market logic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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ownership as an inter partes valid arrangement; in other words, between the contractual parties 
themselves. However, the validity vis-á-vis third parties remains a problem.72 
As Roth points out, the burden which this diversity poses may appear in two different ways. 
First, the creation of a security right is governed by the law of the situs. In case there were 
multiple assets being encumbered across the EU, executing the transaction would require 
application of all local laws of the Member States the assets are located. Naturally, this would 
be a considerable burden. However, a problem of this kind is easier to solve in relationship inter 
partes as the parties could simply use their contractual power to determine the applicable law 
with regard to creation of a security right.73 
In property law, the distinction between inter partes and ultra partes effects is a remarkable 
one. The second problem, Statutenwechsel, is indeed the issue worth concern. Generally, a 
property right validly created under the laws of Member State A will be recognized as itself in 
Member State B, by making a reference to the (original) law of the Member State A. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to a non-possessory pledge, such as a retention of title, it is not 
recognized in the substantial legislation of all Member States as having ultra partes effects. 
When this is the case, a validly created non-possessory pledge may be extinguished when it is 
transferred to the host Member State B. In other words, an ultra partes effective, complete 
security right may become merely inter partes effective when it is moved to another Member 
State whose property law numerus clausus differs in this aspect.74 
One could propose a choice of law clause as an alternative to diminish this problem. However, 
since lex rei sitae is a mandatory rule of private international law in the Member States, option 
to choose lex causae, the substantial applicable law75, is limited to only a couple of cases, such 
as res in transitu situations76. Therefore the problem posed by the use of lex rei sitae, which is 
                                                 
72 Roth 2008, pp. 37–38. 
73 Roth 2008, pp. 38–39.  
74 Roth 2008, p. 39. 
75 Lex causae can be the same as lex fori, which means the national law applied of the court. In most cases, lex fori 
determines that the dispute will be settled according to the national substantial law. Even though lex causae can be 
from another jurisdiction than where the dispute is being settled, the court must always apply its own procedural 
rules in settling the case. Liukkunen 2012, p. 1. See also Koulu 2005, pp. 24–25.  
76 Res in transitu refers to situation, where the object is only being transferred from a Member State A to Member 
State B, and something significant in a lex rei sitae -wise takes place in a country, where the object was solely in 
transit. It has been seen that the principle of import country law applies to most res in transitu situations. Instead, 
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at the same time foreseeable and unforeseeable, remains actual in spite of the parties' will. The 
substantial law of the host Member State will actually cover three issues. First, the law of 
Member State B will determine the legal standing of the security – whether it is considered an 
actual right of pledge or merely a contractual right inter partes. Second, it will dictate the 
relationships vis-á-vis third persons, i.e. effects ultra partes. Third, the local applicable law will 
solve questions on priority order among competing creditors, so to speak the principle of priority 
in the debtor's insolvency.77  
 
2.2.2 Numerus clausus: Germany 
 
German law values maintenance of legal relationships. Even though it follows the lex rei sitae 
rule, it is generally willing to use transposition on a foreign security rights, except in situations 
in which the right is completely unknown in Germany78. If, however, the right closely resembles 
a German functionally equivalent right, it can be transposed into it. Due to the appreciation of 
the principle of publicity, which aims to protect bona fide third parties from unknown foreign 
rights, public policy works as a restraint – an entrance test – in relation to foreign fancies.79 
Germany does not follow a strict closed list of property rights. The purpose of German 
legislation was to facilitate the economy and this was done by enabling encumbrance of the 
maximum amount of objects. The parties to a proprietary transaction are considerably limited 
to use their autonomy, but they are bound to choose one of the available forms of security 
rights80. Parties must also follow the content given to those rights in the law. If parties try to 
give a right a content that the law does not prescribe, the right is not a property right, but 
something else, such as a mere contractual obligation with no effects against third parties.81 
In Germany, the right of ownership can be used as security to secure fulfillment of the parties’ 
obligations. Reservation of title devices, which make use of the ownership to the asset as a 
                                                 
the law of the country, where the object was in transit, is not applicable. Buure-Hägglund 1978, pp. 226–239; 
Juutilainen 2005, p. 99–101.  
77 Roth 2008, pp. 39–40.  
78 This is stated in Article 43 (2) of EGBGB: “Gelangt eine Sache, an der Rechte begründet sind, in einem anderen 
Staat, so können diese Rechte nicht im Widerspruch zu der Rechtsordnung dieses Staates ausgeübt werden.” 
79 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 12. 
80 Van Erp 2008, p. 18.  
81 Akkermans 2008, p. 245–249.  
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security itself, have an important role in German property law and practice. When using these 
devices, the transferee, to which the object has been transferred to by the transferor, does not 
acquire a “real”, normal right of ownership together with possession of the object, but a mere 
security ownership, an ownership for security purposes. Due to this, even though the object may 
be in possession of the transferee, the transferee does not acquire the right of ownership until he 
has fulfilled his contractual obligations with regard to the transferor. Hence, if the transferee 
does not fulfill his obligations, such as pay the purchase price of the object, the object has to be 
returned to the transferor, the original owner.82 
German law recognizes several different retention of title clauses that all have different legal 
effects. A so called simple retention of title clause (einfache Eigentumsvorbehalt) is used when 
the object is sold to the buyer’s own use. The clause is valid and in force as long as the object 
remains in the buyer’s possession in unchangeable form. A so called elongated retention of title 
clause (verlängerter Eigentumsvorbehalt) is applicable when the buyer is entitled to sell the 
product further to a third person or use it in manufacturing process already during the loan 
period. In this situation, the retention of title concerns the claim from the third person or the new 
product that is being made. These clauses can be divided into two groups, manufacturing clauses 
(Verarbeitungsklausel) and proceeds clauses (Vorausabtretungsklausel). In both of these types, 
the seller/creditor can satisfy his claim from a surrogate property, either from the objects having 
been manufactured from the original object, or from the claims having been born due to the 
original buyer/debtor’s sale to further clients and retailers.83 Manufacturing clauses are allowed 
in Germany and thus, valid and binding vis-à-vis third parties – unlike in Finland (see Chapter 
2.2.3.1, second and fifth condition)84. Proceeds clauses are also significant in Germany. They 
give the seller a priority status in the buyer’s possible insolvency.85 
Third version of retention of title clauses is a so called residual clause (nachträglicher 
Eigentumsvorbehalt). Here, the buyer sells the product to a third person with a retention of title, 
without the third person knowing that his acquisition is encumbered by a retention of title of the 
original seller. The clause is fulfilled when the original seller/creditor has received repayment 
                                                 
82 Akkermans 2008, p. 187. 
83 Dalhuisen 2016, p. 97; Håstad 2001, p. 69; Juutilainen 2005, p. 33. 
84 Rutgers 1999, p. 68. 
85 Milo 2003, p. 388; Juutilainen 2005, p. 34; Håstad 2006, p. 41. 
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either in form of payment from the original buyer/debtor or the third person (latter buyer). 
According to German law, retention of title is a form of pledge that also exceeds to the surrogate 
property of the original product, such as claim.86 
There are also so called all-debts clauses, extended retention of title clauses available in German 
law (Kontokorrentvorbehalt or Konzernvorbehalt). These clauses work as pledge for all the 
seller’s claims which have been born in the business relationship between the seller and the 
buyer, or alternatively secure not only the claims of the seller but also the claims of all 
companies belonging to the same group as the seller. Clauses of this kind are not binding on 
third persons in Finland.87 
As a conclusion, a retention of title clause is binding on the buyer/debtor and even his creditors 
in Germany, even if the buyer is entitled to sell the product further during the loan period.88 All 
clauses which are more advanced than simple retention of title clauses, are not binding in 
Finland. This is because, as will be described next, Finnish law sets quite a few requirements 
for a valid retention of title clause. As Håstad has put it, Scandinavian countries share the most 
restrictive view, when it comes to retention of title clauses: the security right to a movable object 
cannot exist, if the buyer the buyer has the right to dispose of the goods before payment.89 
 
2.2.3 Numerus clausus: Finland 
It is has been discussed in literature whether Finnish property law system constitutes a numerus 
clausus. According to Kuusinen, there is no closed list of property rights in Finland. However, 
numerus clausus has relevance in the principle of tyyppipakkoperiaate in Finnish law, so the 
numerus clausus can be seen to apply as a principle, not a rule. The Finnish property rights can 
be divided into three categories: ownership, pledge and usufruct rights.90 Retention of title 
clauses belong to the second category. 
                                                 
86 Tepora 1992, p. 352–353.  
87 Rutgers 1999, 46–47.  
88 Tepora 1992, p. 354–355. 
89 Håstad 2006, p. 41. 
90 Kuusinen 2011, p. 314. 
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Finnish law recognizes retention of title clauses, but only in their simple form. The ownership 
of an asset is agreed to remain on the seller until the buyer has fulfilled certain preconditions. 
Usually, a retention of title is agreed on as a security for the seller's purchase price receivable. 
The normative basis for a retention of title is found in Finnish Sale of Goods Act (355/1987), 
Section 54:4 and Consumer Protection Act (38/1978), Section 5:27.3. According to them, "If 
the goods have been handed over to the buyer, the seller may declare the contract avoided only 
if he has reserved himself such right in the contract or if the buyer rejects the goods." When a 
retention of title clause is effective against third persons, it works much the same way as a 
typical security. In short, there are five preconditions for a retention of title clause to be valid 
and effective against third parties: 
1. The clause has to be agreed on clearly and expressly.91 This condition is not required in 
German law. In Germany, it is possible to agree on a retention of title clause as sile 
(stillschweigende Vereinbarung des Eigentumsvorbehalts): a clause can become part of the 
contract due to a business practice.92 
2. The clause has to be agreed on before the buyer takes possession of the asset. This is stated 
in the Finnish Bankruptcy Act, Section 7.93 According to the Act, in case the debtor is entitled 
to assign the assets to a third party regardless of the retention of title clause, to attach them to 
other assets or "otherwise dispose of the assets as if the debtor were the owner, the term shall 
likewise be of no effect as against the bankruptcy estate". 
3. The clause needs to be directed at an individualized object.94 
4. The clause can only be used as a security for the seller's purchase price receivables and other 
receivables due to the seller's acts concerning the asset.95  
5. The encumbered asset is meant to remain and it will also in practice remain on the buyer's 
possession as an individual object. The clause is not valid and effective towards third parties if 
                                                 
91 KKO 1994:113. 
92 However, it is questionable whether retention of title clauses can be seen as business practice in any field. Claims 
of such practice are being approached with a slight rejection. See Juutilainen 2005, pp. 31–32. 
93 The Finnish Bankruptcy Act, Section 7 prescribes the following: "If the term concerning the retention of title or 
repossession has been agreed on after the debtor has taken possession of the assets on the basis of the assignment, 
the term shall be of no effect as against the bankruptcy estate." See also KKO 1993:45. 
94 Juutilainen 2005, p. 28; Tepora 1984, p. 221. 
95 KKO 1977 I 1. 
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the buyer is still entitled to assign the object further, use it, attach it to another object or otherwise 
dispose of it as if the buyer/debtor were the owner. According to the Government's Proposal of 
the Bankruptcy Act, a retention of title clause is not effective against third persons if the buyer 
is, according to the contract, entitled to, without the assignor's consent, attach the asset to another 
asset so that a component relationship is born between the assets. The following cases decided 
by the Finnish Supreme Court have concerned retention of title clauses and their validity.96  
It is to be noted that a retention of title is a feasible form of pledge in Finland, when the product, 
such as a machine, is being acquired as an investment acquisition and becomes part of the 
buyer’s own usage. Then again, the Finnish system does not suit so well for usage as part of the 
buyer’s trading assets, particularly in cross-border trade. For the Finnish system to move closer 
to the German model, which allows for more flexible types of retention of title clauses and 
considers them binding, a lot should change in the Finnish legal culture. I agree with Tepora 
that, in this case, the registration of a retention of title should become both possible and 
obligatory.97 Then it would be possible to prevent situations, where change of the situs leads to 
the foreign right not being recognized, and hence, it being extinguished in the Member State B.  
In case KKO 2016:46, A had delivered metal sheets to be used in manufacturing doors to B. 
Before the delivery, the parties had agreed on a retention of title clause and that the metal sheets 
were not to be used before the purchase price had been paid. B was put into bankruptcy after the 
delivery, but before B had paid the purchase price. As the bankruptcy estate had not shown that 
A would have, contrary to the contract term, accepted use of the metal sheets already before 
payment, the retention of title clause was valid.98 
According to the Supreme Court, the retention of title clause and the prohibition to attach the 
asset may have been agreed on in such circumstances that the buyer is seen to have had the right 
to attach the asset to other property regardless of the clause that prohibits this. According to the 
Supreme Court, a retention of title clause and the prohibition to attach the asset may have been 
agreed on in such circumstances that the buyer is seen to have had the right to attach the asset 
to other property notwithstanding the restriction in the contract. In such situation, the literal form 
                                                 
96 Government's proposal 26/2003, detailed reasoning, chapter 5, section 7. See also Tuomisto 2005, pp. 502–503.  
97 Tepora 1992, p. 354. 
98 KKO 2016:46. 
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of the agreement cannot be seen to coincide with the real intention of the contracting parties. 
Instead, it is essential what the seller has been able to conclude based on the circumstances and 
how the seller has responded and reacted to the circumstances. The contract, however, has a 
central position in the assessment.  If the bankruptcy estate claims that the buyer has been 
entitled to attach the sheets to other property before they have been fully paid by the buyer, it 
has to substantiate its claim. This would require that the bankruptcy estates shows that the seller 
should have realized that the sheets were going to be used before they were paid for and that the 
seller had taken an acceptable approach to that.99 
KKO 2016:46 is the first decision delivered by the Supreme Court after the new Bankruptcy 
Act came to force that deals with third-party effects of retention of title clauses. What is 
interesting in the decision is how the court has argued about putting the burden of proof on the 
bankruptcy estate in item 11 of the reasoning. Two observations can be made based on it. First, 
it appears from the wording of it that an objective assessment is to be adopted: "the seller should 
have realized". Second, it seems that even an implicit acceptance is enough, and express consent 
is not needed: "and that the seller had taken an acceptable approach to that".100 
The decision KKO 1990:104 was given before the current Bankruptcy Act came into force. In 
this case, a retention of title clause had been effective and valid towards third persons even 
though the buyer, B, had had the right to assign the asset further during the loan period.101 
A had sold assets to B with a retention of title clause. B had then been gone into liquidation, and 
the liquidator had sold, among other thing, B's current assets to C, to which items sold by A 
belonged. After B had gone into bankruptcy, C had paid the purchase price to B's bankruptcy 
estate. When C had made the purchase, it should have been prepared that there might be rights 
of third persons directed at the assets. C had, however, failed to look into whether B could 
validly assign the objects belonging to its current assets. The clause had been binding on C, and 
B had not been entitled to keep the purchase price it had received from C due to the purchase. 
                                                 
99 Pusa 2016. See also Kieninger 2004, p. 434. 
100 The Finnish wording (“- - ja myyjä on suhtautunut tähän hyväksyvästi”) leaves it somewhat ambiguous whether 
the seller has given the acceptance expressly or implicitly. It seems, however, more reasoned that mere implicit 
acceptance is enough. See the judgment, item 11. 
101 KKO 1990:104. See also Tuomisto 1993, p. 115. 
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The later purchase breached the retention of title clause and the original contract. Hence, B's 
bankruptcy estate and C were jointly and severally liable to pay the purchase price to A.  
KKO 1977 I 4 was also decided before the current Bankruptcy Act came to force. According to 
a procurement contract between A and B, A had been entitled to use the windows, which it had 
bought from B, into buildings already before their purchase price had been paid, unless B had 
objected to that before A had mounted the windows. A was put into bankruptcy. Since B, after 
delivering the windows to the construction site, had not used its right to prevent attaching the 
windows, the clause was ineffective and invalid towards A's bankruptcy estate.102 
KKO 1971 II 102 and KKO 1968 II 53 were also given before the current Bankruptcy Act. In 
KKO 1971 II 102, according to a delivery contract between companies A and B, A had been 
entitled to use the assets that it had bought from B to furniture manufacturing even before the 
purchase price had been fully paid. Thus, the retention of title clause was seen as invalid and 
ineffective towards third parties. In KKO 1968 II 53, a retention of title clause was seen as 
invalid and ineffective towards the buyer's later assignee as the buyer was entitled to attach the 
assets to a construction during the loan period.103 
When decisions KKO 1968 II 53 and KKO 1990:104 are compared, the legal state seems 
unclear. The Government’s Proposal to the current Bankruptcy Act states that Chapter 5, Section 
7 can be considered to correspond the then-current state of law. In other words, it did not change 
the legal position, but merely worked as a codification. In general, the Proposal puts on the 
liquidator and the bankruptcy estate the obligation to examine whether there are rights belonging 
to third parties, such as specific agreements with third parties. However, in case the original 
seller has practically transferred his right of ownership to the buyer so that the buyer's position 
is de facto like the position of an owner, the right is not enforceable. If the buyer has the right 
to dispose of the asset during the loan period as if he was the owner, there is no need to protect 
the original seller's right of ownership.104 
                                                 
102 KKO 1977 I 4. On the invalidity of a retention of clause in a situation, where the buyer had right to sell the 
goods before payment of the purchase price, see Kieninger – Graziadei 2004, p. 434. 
103 KKO 1971 II 102; KKO 1968 II 53. 
104 See government's proposal 26/2003, detailed reasoning, chapter 5, section 7. 
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Case KKO 1990:104 seems to constitute an exception to the established legal praxis. It is the 
only case in which this approach has been taken, and the court has not maintained its opinion. 
Instead, it appears to have overruled this case in the later decision KKO 2016:46, which 
corresponds the current wording of the new Bankruptcy Act. Consequently, according to the 
established legal praxis and the codified law, a retention of title clause is not effective against 
third parties, if the buyer is entitled to assign the asset further or attach it to other property before 
he has paid the purchase price to the seller. 
Moreover, there are clear divergences between Finnish and German numerus clausus regimes 
of property law. The Finnish conditions for retention of title clauses described above are not 
recognized and applied in the numerus clausus regime of Germany, where more flexible forms 
of retention of title clauses are allowed. 
 
2.3 Solutions proposed in literature to reduce the problems of lex rei sitae 
 
2.3.1 On the principle of perpetuality of property rights 
 
Buure-Hägglund has argued for the sake of applying a principle called principle of perpetuality 
of property rights to foreign proprietary security rights as well. According to her, if an object 
encumbered by a German proprietary security right, a retention of ownership, is transferred to 
Finland, the principle of perpetuality of property rights should be applied by a Finnish court. 105 
The principle of perpetuality states that as a rule, transfer of a foreign property right does not 
affect the perpetuality of the right. The problem is, however, that this principle has traditionally 
been seen to apply to transfer of ownership and in principal also to traditional forms of pledge. 
Instead, it has formerly been considered not to apply to non-possessory forms of proprietary 
security rights. A foreign right of non-possessory pledge has usually been considered to have 
extinguished if this kind of pledge has been transferred to Finland.106 This strict interpretation 
has later been changed into a more flexible way. However, the newer “soft way” is only 
applicable if nothing significant happens “property law-wise”. As it is always something 
                                                 
105 Buure-Hägglund 1978, p. 201. 
106 Alanen 1965, p. 222. 
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significant that actualizes the change of the applicable legal regime, the newer approach actually 
changes nothing. If a German retention of title clause is considered substantially similar to a 
non-possessory pledge, which is what it most closely resembles, the outcome is an extinguished 
proprietary security right.107 It is the mixed nature of retention of title – partly right of ownership, 
partly non-possessory pledge – that makes it complicated. This is why the principle of 
perpetuality does not offer a satisfactory solution to Statutenwechsel problems with a more 
complicated German retention of title. 
 
2.3.2 Expected or unexpected movement? 
 
Nordic case law and academic discussion have proposed a creditor-friendly alternative to cases 
with cross-border use of retention of title clauses. This is the possibility to differentiate choice-
of-law situations on the basis of the secured creditor’s awareness, or the absence of his 
awareness, that the movable asset would be transferred to a new jurisdiction with different 
preconditions and requirements for third-party effectiveness.108 These developments, even 
though they have not taken place in Finland, but in Denmark and Sweden, are important to take 
into account. Moreover, as this thesis concerns a possible path of development by the ECJ, the 
Court’s dependencies on its Member States have to be taken into account.109 
According to the idea, situation in which the seller-creditor has not been aware or could not have 
reasonably expected the encumbered asset to be moved to another jurisdiction, receives a gentler 
treatment with regard to the applicable substantive law so that the law of the State of origin 
prevails. Then again, had the seller-creditor been aware or had he had reasonable grounds to 
expect that the asset would be moved to a new state after its creation, the creditor would not 
receive this protection. Instead, normal conflict rules would apply in the second option.110  
Grace period is a proposal to facilitate the Statutenwechsel situations derived from the inflexible 
application of lex rei sitae. The theory’s main point is to set a time period of approximately three 
                                                 
107 Koulu 2005, pp. 206 – 211. 
108 Bogdan 2014, pp. 272–275; Juutilainen 2015, pp. 66–67. See also Juutilainen 2015, p. 66 and Juutilainen 2005, 
pp. 106–109. 
109 Gless – Martin 2013, p. 38. 
110 Bogdan 2014, pp. 272–275; Juutilainen 2015, pp. 66–67. See also Juutilainen 2015, p. 66 and Juutilainen 2005, 
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to four months after the asset has been moved to a new jurisdiction, during which the proprietary 
security right remains valid even if it does not fulfil the preconditions for third-party 
effectiveness in Member State B, the forum jurisdiction. The core idea behind the grace period 
is to provide the holder of the security right with a chance to comply with the special 
requirements laid down by the substantive law of the respective host jurisdiction.111 Grace 
period could be applied to situations where the seller’s prediction or awareness of a future 
transfer of the object cannot be required.112 
Germany, as a liberal jurisdiction with regard to both domestic and foreign proprietary security 
rights, has an overall tendency to provide foreign creditors with protection in Statutenwechsel 
situations. Since Germany is a model example of a civil law jurisdiction – contrary to the UK, 
for instance – codified rules are of most significance to its legal order. Hence, it is clear that the 
case law strongly resonates with the legislation, as it does with regard to the treatment of foreign 
proprietary security rights. To a Member State with exceptionally broad range of security 
devices available, it is logical to apply the universal principle of reciprocity and mutually 
recognize and enforce foreign security rights.113 
As a result, Article 43(2) of the EGBGB (Introductory Law to the Civil Code), the basic rule 
with regard to Statutenwechsel situations, sets forth two rules which mirror the underlying 
values, namely liberal attitude towards foreign security rights. According to the Article, 
continuity and perpetuance of a proprietary right created in a foreign jurisdiction form the 
starting point. However, the Article also states that they cannot be fulfilled against the law of 
this Member State B. While importance of perpetuance of security rights created under the initial 
forum jurisdiction is highlighted, this however cannot infringe the law of the new forum 
jurisdiction, whose sovereignty and legislative competence needs to be recognized.114 
                                                 
111 Snijders 2006, pp. 156–157, 159; von Bar and Drobnig – von Bar 2004, p. 469. 
112 Juutilainen 2005, pp. 104–106; Roth 2008, pp. 57–58.  
113 Droblig 2004, pp. 152 – 153; Kieninger 2004, p. 655. 
114 Drobnig – von Bar 2004, pp. 152–153. See also Juutilainen 2015, pp. 222–223. Here, an analogy can be drawn 
draws to the EU internal market logic in general, as the two converging principles resemble the division of labour 
between the trade barrier ban with free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU) and the exception article, the 
justification grounds (Article 36 TFEU) as well as the relationship between the article on free movement of capital 
(Article 63 TFEU) and Article 65 on overriding requirements of the general interest. An interesting point to notice 
is the mutual hierarchy of these competing norms: as equal in the legal hierarchy (either in a treaty or in a national 
legislation), none of them can prevail in a conflict merely due to legal status. This is why case-specific balancing 
and weighing is always present in the internal market law. 
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German Federal Court of Justice delivered a judgment BGHZ 45, 95 based on the Article 43(2) 
in 1966. The case concerned situations with foreign retention of title clauses and initial 
invalidity. The court was willing to recognize the clause and hold it effective. However, the 
clause turned out to had originally been invalid with regard to third-party effects, as it had been 
agreed on orally and without fulfilling the requirements for third-party effectiveness of its initial 
location, Italy. It was interesting that the Italian invalid clause would have been effective and 
binding in Germany, whose law did not know retention of title clauses that were binding only 
between the contracting parties – the clause would only be fully effective or not at all.115  
The court nevertheless decided to take the parties’ intention and the purpose of their transaction 
into account, and went even further. The court formulated an artificial construction of the 
buyer’s “obligation” to transfer the ownership of the goods back to the seller upon their arrival 
to Germany. Now that German law governed the retransfer and its effects against third parties, 
the initial invalidity was “removed”.116 The German judgment is a good example of Germany’s 
liberal, flexible attitude towards foreign proprietary rights. It also demonstrates the country’s 
appreciation of the principle of reciprocity by showing that the German courts are prepared and 
willing to recognize foreign rights.117 
Juutilainen has ended up dividing Statutenwechsel situations with retention of title clauses into 
two groups. The first group consists of situations, where the seller has been able to predict at 
the moment of making the agreement that the object could de facto be located in a different 
country later on during the loan period, and situations, where this kind of prediction cannot have 
been present. The first group – prediction has been possible – can further be divided into the 
following situations: (1) it was the parties’ intention to transfer the object to the Member State 
B, (2) the seller was aware of the buyer’s intent to transfer the object to Member State B, or (3) 
the seller should have been aware of the buyer’s intent of transferring the object to Member 
State B. Juutilainen has then continued that whether the seller has, one way or another, been or 
if he should have been aware and has thus been able to predict the transfer, he cannot be given 
better protection than a local seller/creditor would receive.118  
                                                 
115 The judgment BGHZ 45, 95 (2 February 1966), pp. 96–97.  
116 The judgment, pp. 98–101. See also Juutilainen 2015, pp. 223–224 and Drobnig – von Bar 2004, pp. 153–154. 
117 Drobnig – von Bar 2004, pp. 344–345.  
118 Juutilainen 2005, pp. 83–85.  
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A significant inspiration to Juutilainen’s theory has been the principle of import country law 
which, according to Juutilainen, could be applicable to the Finnish system as itself. The 
principle states that when an expected move of an object is concerned, the law of the new situs 
governs the possible third-party conflicts. This view is supported by the fact that Swedish law 
has a considerably similar approach when it comes to expected import situations.119   
The first judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Sweden on a foreign retention of title 
clause and its third-party effects was NJA 1978 p. 593. The case, much like my own practice 
case “Y GmbH vs. Finland”, dealt with a German contract of sale with a retention of title clause 
between German seller and Swedish buyer. The clause in question was effective in the German 
numerus clausus, but ineffective vis-à-vis third parties in Sweden as it allowed resale of the 
encumbered objects. The thing is, similarly to Finnish law and unlike to German law, Swedish 
law does not recognize other than the so called simple retention of title clauses. The Supreme 
Court of Sweden ended up regarding the German clause not enforceable against the third parties 
in question, namely the buyer’s creditors.120 This can be seen as pure and direct application of 
the lex rei sitae rule: the German right lost its third party effectiveness as it was transferred to a 
new jurisdiction, in which it was seen invalid121. 
The second judgment, NJA 1984 p. 693, shed more light on the issue in Sweden. This case dealt 
with security transfer of ownership: the ownership of a car that had been registered in Germany 
was used as security for a German savings bank as the bank had extended a loan for the buyer 
for purchasing the car. The security ownership was supposed to be transferred back to the owner 
of the car – the security-provider debtor – as he had repaid the loan. At the moment of creating 
the proprietary security right, Germany was the location of the car. The buyer-debtor had 
connections to both Germany and Sweden, and had lent the car to another person who drove it 
to Sweden. When the car was located in Sweden, Swedish Tax Authorities used their right of 
distraint for the buyer-debtor’s tax debts in Sweden. The issue then became of whether the Tax 
Authorities had been entitled to the distraint as the German savings bank had the security 
ownership, a proprietary security right, for the car. However, a pre-question was to be solved 
                                                 
119 Juutilainen 2005, p. 113. The principle of import country law, princippet om importlandets ret, has gained some 
ground through two rulings by the Supreme Court of Denmark, UfR 1983.311 H and UfR 1984.8 H. See Juutilainen 
2015, pp. 219–220.  
120 Juutilainen 2015, pp. 216–219.  
121 Persson 1998, pp. 676–677.  
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first: was the German security transfer recognizable and enforceable in Sweden, even though 
the Swedish substantive law required fulfillment of certain publicity preconditions that were not 
required under German substantive law?122 
The Swedish court ended up delivering a rather elaborative, yet simple ruling. It settled the case 
by cancelling the Swedish Tax Authorities’ distraint and stated that as a starting point, foreign, 
originally valid and binding proprietary right remains valid and binding even after it has been 
transferred to Sweden. This principle got support from the principle of reciprocity: if valid 
Swedish rights should be recognized and enforced elsewhere, Sweden should also provide the 
same treatment to rights “imported” from other jurisdictions.123  
However, the main rule was not without exceptions, the extent of which was to be kept narrow. 
First, the foreign right would be non-enforceable in Sweden, even if it was validly created, if it 
was presumed at the moment of contracting that it would be transferred to Sweden. The second 
exception follows the first one’s logic: if the creditor should have presumed that the object 
would probably be exported to Sweden due to the buyer-debtor’s strong connections to Sweden, 
there would be no enforcement in Sweden – the creditor should simply have taken this 
possibility into account while disposition of the asset. The third exception concerns situations 
that resemble the idea of grace period. After some period of time has elapsed since the object 
was transferred to Sweden, there is no longer need for the foreign right to remain effective.124 
The judgment NJA 1984 p. 693 fits well with an idea of division of unforeseeability costs 
resulting from Statutenwechsel situations, which Juutilainen has taken as one of his leading 
objectives in his doctoral dissertation on secured credit in Europe, the other two objectives being 
foreseeability and responsiveness. The judgment also partly represents what the notion of 
transnational conception of justice includes, such as the concept of reciprocity.125 
Koulu considers it important that with an object that is being brought from Germany to Finland 
and which has been encumbered by a retention of title, the retention of title extinguishes if the 
agreement between the parties allows the buyer to sell the asset to another country and the seller 
                                                 
122 The judgment (NJA 1984), p. 698; see also Juutilainen 2015, p. 2017. 
123 The judgment (NJA 1984), p. 699. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See Juutilainen 2015, pp. 109–112.  
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was aware of the buyer’s intention to transfer the asset to another country.126 The principle of 
import country law has taken into account the uncertainty and unpredictability of 
Statutenwechsel situations. However, even this approach is not without doubts and drawbacks. 
First and foremost, evidence about the seller’s awareness may be difficult to obtain even if 
certain presumption is used.127 Moreover, despite the institutional support by Danish and 
Swedish courts and Juutilainen’s proposal to extend its use, the principle still enjoys merely 
doctrinal support in Finland, where it is yet to be applied to actual cases. Therefore, it provides 
only insecure solution and my research questions remain valid. However, the judgments 
elaborated above could work as inspiration for the ECJ, if a preliminary ruling came before it. 
According to Juutilainen, when the seller has not been and could not have been aware of the 
buyer’s intention to transfer the object to a different jurisdiction with different numerus clausus, 
the applicable rule used by the respectable Member State B needs to be a compromise between 
the rights of the seller and the third persons entitled to the object. The seller’s need for protection 
becomes more considerable, if the object has been transferred to the Member State B without 
the seller’s awareness or, particularly, against the agreement between the parties.128  
For these situations, Juutilainen has proposed application of the so called transposition doctrine. 
According to the doctrine, the foreign retention of title clause is “replaced” with a local, 
domestic clause – thus, the doctrine is also called domestication or substitution. If the clause has 
been binding on third persons in the Member State A, the original country, it will remain binding 
also in Member State B. I will revert to the idea of transposition in Chapter 2.5.129 
 
2.3.3 Lex registrationis – a black horse running for rescue? 
 
Lex registrationis could offer a feasible solution since it manages to avoid the usual drawbacks 
of the lex rei sitae rule by focusing on the state of the relevant registry as the decisive connecting 
factor. This means application of the law of the country of origin as the country of the registry 
is usually the one where the proprietary security right is created.130  Lex registrationis usually 
                                                 
126 Koulu 2005, p. 213. 
127 Juutilainen 2015, pp. 217–222; Koulu 2005, p. 213. 
128 Juutilainen 2005, pp. 102–104.  
129 Juutilainen 2005, pp. 106–109 and 114. 
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concerns major means of transport, such as ships and aircraft.131 Convention on international 
interests in mobile equipment, Cape Town Convention of 2001, regulates movable means of 
transport. This includes highly valuable objects, such as trains, airplanes and ships.132 
However, not all Member States have enacted the lex registrationis rule. Therefore, it cannot be 
trustworthy to rely on its application in cross-border conflicts as the applicable substantive law 
may prove unexpected from the creditor’s point of view. Since most Member States have chosen 
to apply the traditional lex rei sitae, a conflict between these two approaches might turn out to 
be even more confusing than the situation with the mere lex rei sitae rule. 
A vivid example of a cross-border conflict involving these divergent conflict rules is case Blue 
Sky One Ltd & Ors v Mahan Air & Anor, decided by the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales on 25 March 2010. The relevant part of the case between the UK and the Netherlands 
with regard to cross-border use of proprietary security rights was the question which law governs 
the validity of a mortgage over an aircraft. The aircraft was registered in the United Kingdom 
but when the mortgage was created, its location was the Netherlands. Here, it is crucial to notice 
that English substantive law recognized the mortgage as valid, while the Dutch law considered 
it invalid. The relevant English conflict rule was lex rei sitae, whereas the Netherlands used lex 
registrationis. This resulted in a situation where a dilemma of renvoi was also present.133 
As the aircraft was located in the Netherlands at the time of creation of the mortgage, it was a 
Dutch court to decide on the substantive matter. As the Dutch law did not recognize the 
mortgage, applying solely the Dutch substantive law could have resulted in a negative outcome 
with regard to enforceability against the mortgagor. On the other hand, if the court was to apply 
Dutch private international law, it would mean accepting renvoi by referring the case back to 
English law. This choice would therefore be preferable concerning the enforceability of the 
mortgage as it was recognized in the English substantive law. The case demonstrates that not 
only are the divergences in national substantive laws threats to cross-border legal certainty in 
                                                 
131 Juutilainen 2015, p. 67; 194. 
132 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Cape Town, 13 November 2001. See also 
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that they may result in different outcomes on the same conflict, but that also the divergences 
concerning the use of renvoi may affect the outcome in an unpredictable manner. Had the lex 
rei sitae rule been in use in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, without acceptance 
of renvoi, the applicable substantive law would have been Dutch law. Then again, had both 
States opted for the lex regisrationis rule, it would have been English substantive law to apply.134 
Lex contractus is another alternative to lex rei sitae. However, it cannot be seen as feasible when 
property law and relations to third parties are concerned, as has also been pointed out.135 Lex 
registrationis, on the other hand, could provide a feasible alternative to lex rei sitae in 
Statutenwechsel situations in Finland. Finland could follow the model of Norway, where a sale 
pledge – an equivalent to retention of title clause – is possible to register in a movable goods 
register, (irtaimistorekisteri, løsoreregisteret) if the object itself can be registered136. This could 
be an applicable alternative to for example automobiles that are already registered in one country 
– registering them in a security register would not be a far-fetched step. It would also 
significantly lessen problems caused to foreign sellers in cases where the object has been 
transferred to an unexpected country and the validity of the security right has been up to the new 
jurisdiction.137 Registration of the foreign right as itself within a certain grace period might 
prove a feasible alternative both in the light of the domestic legal order and its publicity concerns 
as well as for the foreign seller-creditor, whose right would not face the risk of extinguishing138. 
 
  
                                                 
134 It is worth remembering that the Netherlands can be seen as a strict jurisdiction, while the United Kingdom falls 
to the liberal category in their attitude towards divergent proprietary security rights and the principle of numerus 
clausus. This attitude is seen in the Member States’ attitude towards accepting the validity of the mortgage. See 
Kieninger 2004, p. 655. 
135 See Juutilainen 2005, p. 112. 
136 See Falkanger, TfR 1987, p. 224; Tepora 1992, p. 356. 
137 Polak 2006, p. 126. 
138 Roth 2008, p. 56–57.  
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2.4 The national court’s three choices: pure recognition, transposition or refusal to enforce 
the foreign right 
 
2.4.1 “Pure” recognition of a foreign proprietary security right in Member State B – the most 
optimal way to apply fundamental freedoms? 
 
The most optimal means of treating foreign proprietary security rights is to recognize them as 
they are, as validly created foreign security rights. When a foreign right is recognized, their legal 
effects are the same as they were in the jurisdiction in which they were created.139 To accept the 
foreign right as its current form into the host jurisdiction would mean application of the law of 
the Member State A to the right. Likelihood for accepting this approach depends on the host-
state’s attitudes towards applying foreign law.140 As it is, most courts tend to apply their own 
law, which makes pure recognition rarer in practice141.  
Roth proposes that the “state of origin principle” developed already in Cassis de Dijon case law 
could be applicable to foreign security rights as well. However, this rule has been stated by the 
ECJ to belong to the primary EU law, which is why it cannot be relevant anymore. This is still 
no excuse for Member States to not recognize foreign proprietary security rights.142  
An effective application of fundamental freedoms may even require Member States to recognize 
validly created foreign rights. This has been stated in three judgments of the ECJ, Centros, 
Überseering and Inspire Art, which all concerned freedom of establishment in another Member 
State.143 In Uberseering, the Court held that a corporation that has been validly established in 
accordance with the law of a Member State, must be recognized in other Member States144. This 
shows the ECJ’s approach to interpret the fundamental freedoms in a way to set the Member 
States an obligation to give recognition to the legal provisions of other Member States145. 
 
                                                 
139 Roth 2008, p. 44. 
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2.4.2 Transposition as a subsidiary means of recognition – a solution?  
 
Transposition might provide an alleviation to Statutenwechsel situations. When transposition 
works accordingly, the security right attached to an asset which has crossed the borders between 
jurisdictions A and B will be given the status of a functionally equivalent national security right. 
This is done by transposing the original right into a respective new right known to the numerus 
clausus regime of the Member State B. The method can be seen as a subsidiary means to 
recognize a foreign right. To transpose the original right thus means not recognizing it as such, 
as the original foreign right it was when it was moved across the border, but instead as a security 
right which is accepted and recognized within the numerus clausus regime of the new situs 
jurisdiction. Through transposition, or assimilation as Roth puts it, the validly created security 
right will not extinguish after entering the jurisdiction of Member State B.146 
A vivid example of the transposition method is a German case BGH 20 March from 1963. It 
concerned a French truck that had been encumbered by a right of pledge, gage sur véhicule, in 
France. The car was transferred to Germany, where it was seized due to the buyer’s outstanding 
debt. The Supreme Court of Germany, Bundesgerichtshof, stated that the German law did not 
recognize a non-possessory pledge to a car equivalent to the pledge at hand. However, as this 
right was close to German assignment by way of security, the French creditor had to be given 
the same privileged position as the assignee of the German right would have.147 
Roth has stated that in recognizing foreign rights, a Member State has to treat the foreign rights 
in a non-discriminatory manner, even though they might be unknown to the domestic 
jurisdiction. Here, the non-discriminatory treatment means treating the right in the same way as 
the legal order treats the right’s domestic counterpart. Roth continues by stating that in case a 
functionally equivalent security rights cannot be found in the respective jurisdiction, the foreign 
right needs to be assessed and classified against the legal background of its original location. 
This approach requires that the foreign right’s priority and relationship among other rights need 
                                                 
146 Roth 2008, p. 40; Akkermans 2008, p. 492. See also Koulu 2005, p. 199. 
147 Kieninger 2004, p. 18. 
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to follow what they were in the Member State A where the right was created. The result should 
be without any disadvantages to the foreign right.148  
Koulu considers transposition as a completely sufficient solution to the Statutenwechsel 
problem.149 However, there are reasons to support the opposite. Transposition has the potential 
to work, but it may be more complicated in practice due to public policy choices and the 
principle of numerus clausus. The doctrine will only work if the new jurisdiction can offer a 
functionally equivalent right. As Akkermans points out, the outcome of transposition may not 
always be what the holder of the right would appreciate. The rights that are granted under the 
host jurisdiction will not always compare to rights that were created in the Member State A.150 
A transposition will only be fully effective if the Member State B can actually transpose the 
original right into a functional equivalent known to it. As Roth puts it, it is possible that the host 
jurisdiction does not recognize any kind of non-possessory pledges and will therefore simply 
consider them effective only inter partes, between the contractual parties.151 There are many 
examples in which the holder of the right has lost either all or part of his right due to incorrectly 
functioning transposition. One of these is the case Sisal discussed above.152 
Drobnig and von Bar had a wide report made on European contract and property law in which 
the findings were based on questions that legal practitioners were asked. One of these questions 
was this: “Have problems arisen in business transactions with foreign parties because of 
differences in the legal rules governing acquisition and loss of ownership of movable 
property?153 The study showed that divergences between the capability and even willingness to 
recognize foreign security rights in the Member State B and transpose them into local 
counterparties exist across Europe. Particularly non-possessory pledges and retention of title 
clauses divide views among Member States.154  
                                                 
148 Roth 2008, p. 61. As will be further elaborated later on, I have ended up supporting Roth’s conclusion of 
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153 Von Bar – Drobnig 2004, p. 432. 
154 Drobnig 2006, pp. 113 – 115.  
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Value-driven policy choices lead to construction of the national closed property law regime. 
Member States bear significant differences on their approach to accepting and enforcing validly 
created foreign security rights. The greatest divergences concern non-possessory security rights, 
such as retention of title. Some Member States, such as Germany, accept a wide range of modern 
security rights to enhance the prosperous functioning of both domestic and international trade. 
Non-possessory security rights can indeed be considered more common and beneficial in the 
context of modern international trade – they do not require the creditor to possess the 
encumbered assets due to which the debtor can continue harnessing the assets in its daily 
business.155 Particularly extensions of retention of title are often seen as pointless attempts to 
encumber a movable object with a non-possessory security right. These rights are effective only 
in Germany, Portugal and the UK. Instead, simple retention of title clauses are treated more 
favourably and almost similarly throughout Europe.156 
Kieninger has divided European countries into two groups with regard to their attitude towards 
the strictness of requirements for publicity and specificity of encumbered assets within that 
jurisdiction. The attitude actualizes when the respective jurisdiction faces the challenge to 
recognize a foreign security right. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, Spain, 
France, Portugal, Scotland, Belgium and Italy are strict jurisdictions. According to Kieninger, 
these systems approach non-possessory security rights with a “comparatively hostile attitude”. 
The liberal jurisdictions, in turn, include Germany, Greece, Ireland and England, which 
generally have a much more flexible attitude towards foreign security rights in movables.157 
 
2.4.3 Refusal to recognize 
 
The third option for the court is to simply refuse recognition and enforcement of the foreign 
right. This is a possibility, if the foreign right is so unknown to the national numerus clausus 
that it is decided not to be given any property effect. Application of this refusal-policy is usually 
a consequence of the public policy in the respective jurisdiction, where rights of third parties 
are considered more valuable than foreign creditors that use non-publishable, unknown rights 
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to the host jurisdiction. However, this approach is in breach of the concept of reciprocity which 
is appreciated in most countries.158  
According to Kieninger, it is quite frequent that the numerus clausus of the Member State B 
forms an obstacle to proper recognition and enforcement of foreign property rights. An example 
of poor transposition – or should I say, refusal to even recognize the foreign right – is a case 
decided in 25 June 1964 by Belgian Rechtbank van Koophandel te Kortrijk159. A German 
company sold and delivered goods to the buyer, a Belgian company with a retention of title 
clause. The buyer became insolvent before having paid the full purchase price, which led the 
seller trying to recover his goods in the Belgian insolvency proceedings. The Belgian law 
governed the question of whether the retention of title was effective against third parties, and it 
held the German right invalid. Even transposition could not have worked as Belgian numerus 
clausus did not know any functionally equivalent right to the German retention of title. It was 
further stated in the decision that Belgian courts deny the validity of reservation of ownership 
clauses in a continuous manner and especially when there is competition between the retention 
of title creditor and other creditors.160 
Another good illustration is a German-Italian case decided in 1956 by the Court of Appeal of 
Milan161. The German seller had sold goods to an Italian company using a retention of title 
clause. The goods were transferred to Italy, where the buyer was became insolvent before the 
purchase price had been fully paid. The applicable Italian law required a valid retention of title 
to be contained in a document with a date that had been ascertained. This requirement demanded 
it being acquired through, for example, registration of the document or through notarial 
verification. The German seller had not known about this formal requirement, and consequently, 
his right could not be enforced by the Italian court. The outcome was not even transposition, but 
plain non-recognition which resulted in the German seller losing his security.162 
Yet another vivid example of refusal is the case of Société DIAC from 3 March 1867 which is 
still applied nowadays by Cour de cassation, the Supreme Court of France. A German company 
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DIAC had extended a loan to another German company for purchasing a car. The pledge 
included a retention of title clause. The car was transferred to France, where a Statutenwechsel 
situation actualized. The French Court of Appeal (Cour d’Appel) considered the pledge 
prohibited in France and it was thus against French public policy. Due to wide application of 
lex rei sitae, the court refused to recognize and enforce the right.163  
According to Akkermans, Member States have only a limited possibility to justify their practice 
of non-recognition of a foreign right under the EU internal market law. Therefore, the ECJ 
would probably not accept numerus clausus the coherence of a national system of property 
rights, as a valid argument from a Member State with ease.164 
 
2.5 Conclusion and application to the case “Y GmbH vs. Finland” 
 
In case “Y GmbH v. Finland”, Finland does not refuse recognition of the German right, but recognition of it 
as itself, a foreign, more advanced type of retention of title, is not possible either. Moreover, Finland is unable 
to transpose the German right in full effect, since it would jeopardize the purpose of the original transaction 
and the non-possessory pledge which has been used. It seems that transposition is not sufficient. 
This chapter being titled as “preliminary” might lead one to ask whether its breadth is reasonable 
and justified. My answer is yes – exploring the research questions set in this thesis would have 
been superficial and even void without setting a specific concrete background with Member 
States whose attitudes towards foreign non-possessory property rights differ quite significantly. 
Furthermore, by looking into the way other Nordic courts have resolved recognition issues 
concerning foreign retention of title clauses originating in Germany I have been able to construe 
a relatively reliable basis on how Finland might resolve the same issue. This supports adopting 
a research method that employs Finland as the main country in a fictional case. The findings in 
this chapter are also relevant when it comes to how the ECJ might treat the issue. 
According to Roth, the purpose of fundamental freedoms of the EU, namely free movement of 
goods and capital in this context, is first and foremost to secure that foreign traders and 
consumers have an undistorted access to the markets across the EU. As he points out, it is not 
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the diversity of rules as such, but the national approach and attitude towards recognizing and 
enforcing foreign proprietary security rights that constitutes the problem. Rules can be different, 
but they should not prevent foreign market actors from accessing the market of another Member 
State. There is still a problem that cannot be solved merely by applying the academic proposals 
and principles presented in this chapter. This is due to their non-coherent application throughout 
the Member States. Hence, applying the elaborated principles and ideas might even further 
jeopardize the proper functioning of the internal market.165 
Moreover, as Akkermans and Ramaekers point out, the EU can be seen to have its own ordre 
public, which requires proper functioning of the internal market. This means that the Member 
States are under an obligation to reserve the public policy of the EU, i.e. remove possible barriers 
to cross-border trade, or at least justify them. Because of the principle of supremacy, EU law 
will always take priority before national law166 Consequently, my main research question 
remains to be investigated further.  
 
3 FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND PROPRIETARY 
SECURITY RIGHTS 
 
3.1 The structure of reasoning 
 
As stated before, my main interest in this thesis lies in the question of whether the national 
measure in question – badly executed transposition or pure refusal to recognize or enforce the 
foreign right – can constitute a trade barrier, infringement to free movement of capital, within 
the meaning of Article 63 TFEU. Before this, the research done into the ECJ’s case law on 
Article 34 TFEU and its interpretations needs to be investigated. The question is: is there a 
doctrine concerning proprietary security rights and the free movement of goods? If the answer 
is yes, the next step is  whether the measure could however be justified with Article 36 TFEU 
and the proportionality test. If the answer is no, the Member State is prohibited to continue 
                                                 
165 Roth 2008, pp. 41–42.  
166 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 22. 
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application of the measure.167 After this, it will be elaborated if this reasoning could be 
transferred to the field of Article 63 TFEU. Here, the interest lies in finding a bridge between 
proprietary security rights, or here retention of title clauses, and the movement of capital. 
 
3.2 Institutional support: Is there applicable case law of the ECJ? 
 
3.2.1 Cases of rules of private law 
 
A slight institutional support might be found in the judgments of the ECJ. After Dassonville, 
the ECJ has significantly broadened the scope of a MEE – a trade barrier does not need to be 
“enacted” by the Member State, it does not have to be a “trading rule” or a “rule”. It is merely 
sufficient that the Member State applies the measure as a part of consistent policy or practice.168 
A few judgments of the Court concern rules of private law of a Member State. CMC 
Motorradcenter dealt with German case law on the contracting parties obligation to provide 
each other with information prior to the contract and whether this obligation constituted a MEE. 
It was elaborated on whether the obstacle to internal market was too uncertain as it was 
dependent on the customer’s decision to buy or not to buy. The question on a possible trade 
barrier was however not excluded as the possible influences on internal market were not 
“insignificant”. It was stated by the German Government that the obligation was justified and 
proportionate with regard to the aim being pursued, namely protection of the customer.169  
As a result, the Court found no restriction or obstacle to free movement of goods. Instead, it 
formulated its decisive words, according to which “It follows that the restrictive effects which 
the said obligation to provide information might have on the free movement of goods are too 
uncertain and too indirect to warrant the conclusion that it is liable to hinder trade between 
Member States”170. The significant part, according to the Court, that even constituted a risk for 
the free movement of goods, was not the German rule itself, but the fact that certain dealers 
                                                 
167 See, for example, Juutilainen 2015, p. 84. 
168 Barnard 2013, pp. 74–76.  
169 Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter GmbH v. Pel in Baskiciogullari (1993) ECR I-5009. 
170 The judgment, para 12; cursives inserted by the author. At the end of the paragraph, the Court made a reference 
to case Krantz, an important judgment in which the “too uncertain and indirect” rule was also used. 
 48 
 
refused to “perform services under the guarantee on motorcycles which have been the subject 
of parallel imports”171. This, in turn, left a lot in the hands of individual, private actors.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note what the Court did not say in CMC Motorradcenter: it did 
not deny applicability of free movement Articles to private law of the Member States. This can 
be seen to mean that rules of private law could, at least in principle, bring about a trade barrier.172 
Alsthom Atlantique173 concerned selling of goods and private law regimes in Europe. The 
judgment can be read in a way as to provide support for the argument of non-recognition or non-
enforcement of foreign security rights174. It dealt with the question of whether French case law 
on contract law, which dealt with a provision on the vendor’s liability and which had no 
counterparties in the case law of other Member States, constituted a MEE. The Court stated that 
in an international sales agreement, the parties are in general free to choose the law applicable 
to their relations inter partes and therefore, they can avoid application of French private law175. 
The result of the Court was that no breach of free movement had taken place176. 
In accordance with Rome I Regulation, it is indeed true that in general, choice-of-law clauses 
of this kind are accepted between the contracting parties177. However, as has been stated already 
previously in this thesis, this possibility does not exceed to property law relations as they 
concern effects towards third parties. A choice-of-law clause which has effects outside the 
parties themselves, is rarely possible to make. Unlike mere contractual rights, property rights 
tend to be without use if they do not have effects against third parties, such as the debtor’s 
followers or other creditors.178 
 
  
                                                 
171 The judgment, para. 11. 
172 Rutgers 1999, pp. 183 – 184; Juutilainen 2015, p. 86; Kieninger 1996b, p. 54.  
173 Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique SA v. Compagnie de construction mécanique Sulzer SA (1991) ECR I-107. 
174 At least Juutilainen has been of this opinion based on the reasoning of the Court in this case. See Juutilainen 
2015, p. 86. 
175 The judgment, para. 15. 
176 The judgment, para. 16. 
177 Rome I Regulation, Article 3. 
178 See Juutilainen 2015, p. 86. 
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3.2.2 Oosthoek, Clinique – and the always problematic Keck 
 
Oosthoek179and Clinique180offer two different views on how the Keck judgment could affect 
interpretation of situations similar to non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign 
proprietary security rights. The ruling in Keck was significant in how it divided the possibly 
Article 34 TFEU-breaching national measures into two categories, the ones that restrict or 
prohibit “certain selling arrangements” and measures on the product itself. “Certain selling 
arrangements” would not breach Article 34 TFEU, if the provisions apply equally to all 
“relevant” traders that operate within the Member State in question, and if they have formally 
and substantially equal effect on “the marketing of domestic products and those from other 
Member States”181. Instead, as long as rules relating to the product itself were concerned, the 
ECJ did not change its interpretation developed in Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon182. The 
judgment has become quite controversial as the distinction has been seen as artificial and 
theoretical.183The Court has indeed later embraced the more practical market access test184. 
Oosthoek is a judgment delivered in 1982 that could have been settled differently, had it been 
given after Keck.  Oosthoek concerned a Netherlands legislation that restricted the offering of 
products as gifts for sales promotion purposes. Even though the Court eventually found that no 
obstacle to internal trade was taking place, the argumentation of the judgment resembles what 
was stated in Keck over ten years later. The Court prescribed that national legislation that 
“restricts or prohibits certain means of sales promotion may, although it does not directly affect 
imports, be such as to restrict their volume, because it affects marketing opportunities for the 
imported products”. The Court then went on to state that there remains a possibility that if a 
producer is compelled to either “adopt his advertising or sales promotion schemes” or refrain 
from exercising a practice that he regards as specially effective, this may form a trade barrier 
                                                 
179 Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV (1982) ECR 4575. 
180 Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratoires SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics 
GmbH (1994) ECR I-317. 
181 The judgment, para. 16. 
182 See the judgment, paras. 11 and 16. 
183 See for example Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 7–8.  
184 See Head 2015, pp. 37–39.  
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even if the national rules in question (which are different within the EU) apply equally to 
domestic and imported products.185 
Kieninger has argued for the sake of that the ruling in Oosthoek gives valid reasons to include 
non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign retention of title clauses in the scope of Article 
34 TFEU. According to her, the use of retention of title clauses by the seller can be seen as 
marketing of the product. As a result, the Oosthoek formula (described above) applies to 
retention of title clauses.186  
Kieninger goes on by stating that in a situation where the substantive law of the import country 
and the lex rei sitae rule lead to the foreign retention of title clause becoming non-recognized 
and non-enforced, the Oosthoek formula takes place. In accordance with the formulation of the 
judgment, this would lead the seller to either abandon the way he is used to promote his sales, 
or being compelled to change it, which results in his transactions becoming more expensive or 
difficult to carry out. In a situation like this, the seller has four choices. First, he can choose not 
to extend credit at all with debtors. Second, he can abandon granting credit with security and 
grant it without it instead, which results in growing of the costs and the risk. The third option 
would also increase the costs as it would be demanding personal security, in which situation 
financial institutions would probably become part of the arrangement. Finally, the seller could 
engage in creating a security which satisfies the needs of the import country. However, there is 
no doubt that the fourth option would be a lot more difficult for sellers originating in other 
Member States than in the specific country of import.187 
According to Kieninger, Oosthoek did not lose its validity even after Keck was introduced. Part 
of this argument is how judgments after Keck have been written. Clinique concerned marketing 
of products of under a name “Clinique” that was liable to mislead customers, and was given 
after Keck. Here, the Court had to deal with both the concept of “certain selling arrangements” 
and measures on the product itself, but the Court only explicitly mentioned the measures 
concerning the product itself even though it made a reference to Keck. This reasoning – to refer 
to a ruling with an argument that was not even the most significant finding in the judgment in 
                                                 
185 Case 286/81 Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij BV (1982 ECR 4575, para. 15. 
186 Kieninger 1996b, p. 55. 
187 Kieninger 1996b, p. 56. Roth has also supported this reasoning. See Roth 2008, p. 49. 
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question – seems to suggest that the Court was already regretting establishment of the concept 
of “certain selling arrangements”.188  
Moreover, Kieninger argues, the reasoning in Oosthoek was rather similar to the arguments 
presented in Cassis de Dijon, when it came to considering the adaptation costs for a foreign 
seller as a result of the national measure. Kieninger’s third  argument is the telos of Article 34 
TFEU; how only this interpretation fits with the purpose of the Article.189 Then again, it is to be 
noted that it is only the ECJ that can give valid interpretations on EU law190. Therefore, 
Kieninger’s third argument remains a mere opinion. 
Nevertheless, Kieninger wrote her arguments in over two decades ago, before the ECJ had even 
given its first ruling based on the market access test. Can Oosthoek and Kieninger’s reasoning 
of its connections with treatment of foreign retention of title clauses be still held relevant? This 
question will be reverted to in chapter 3.4. 
 
3.2.3 Krantz: A case with a German retention of title clause 
 
Krantz is by far the only ruling of the ECJ that has dealt with movable property and the issues 
of free movement of goods, albeit not directly and in a rather disappointing manner. What is 
significant, is that the judgment did not refer to free movement of capital, since the current 
Article 63 TFEU was not directly applicable then. Consequently, the judgment or its subsequent 
discuss did not include elaboration of whether there might have been a restriction of freedom of 
capital movement which needed to be justified.191 The case has become a subject for renewed 
attention due to recent developments in the Court’s case law, namely use of the market access 
test.  What is more, the case made it known that although property law is a highly national field 
of law, it still belongs to the scope of EU law. This holds true even though the triggering event 
in the case had, in a narrow sense, more to do with national insolvency than property law.192  
                                                 
188 Case C-315/92 Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb eV v. Clinique Laboratoires SNC and Estée Lauder Cosmetics 
GmbH (1994) ECR I-317, para. 13. 
189 Kieninger 1996b, pp. 58–60.  
190 Article 267 TFEU. 
191 See Roth 2008, p. 53. 
192 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, pp. 1–3.  
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Krantz dealt with a sale of a machine with a German retention of title clause to a Dutch buyer. 
However, after the machine had been delivered to the buyer in the Netherlands, the buyer came 
into financial difficulties and a liquidation process began. Since the machine was located on a 
land owned by the buyer, Dutch Tax Authorities seized it. As the machine was in the 
Netherlands, Dutch law applied and thus governed the retention of title.193  
According to Dutch law, the seizure was allowed as they had a better priority on the debtor’s 
property. Article 16 of the law on the collection of the State’s direct taxes prescribed that “third 
parties who consider themselves entitled, wholly or in part, to movable property seized by reason 
of a tax debt - - may not bring an action against seizure on account of a tax debt - - if movable 
property intended for furnishing or equipping a house or farm or for cultivating or working land 
are on the debtor’s premises at the time of seizure194”. According to the interpretation of the 
Article, it extends these restrictions to cover movable property that is being used for running of 
an enterprise. Instead, it does not extend to raw materials or finished products found on the 
premises.195 As a matter of fact, the situation did not lead to the Dutch court refusing to 
recognize or enforce the foreign retention of title right – in fact, this issue was not actually 
considered. The situation was simply resolved in favor of the tax authorities’ right of seizure.196 
When Krantz was brought before the ECJ, the claimant, a German seller, argued that the seizure, 
or more specifically the Netherlands law concerning the collection on direct taxes, violated the 
provisions granted by EU law about free movement of goods. According to him, general 
awareness within other Member States of the Netherlands’ approach to rights of third persons 
in this situation would result in “considerable decline in sales on instalment terms”197.  
It was stated in the proceedings that the mentioned Article was not intended to regulate cross-
border trade and, moreover, was equally applicable to domestic and imported products, which 
the Court accepted. According to the Court, the Dutch legislation in question applied “without 
distinction to both domestic and imported goods” and did not have as its purpose to control trade 
                                                 
193 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands State (1990) ECR 
I-583. 
194 Advocate General Darmon’s Opinion on Krantz, para. 3. 
195 Ibid. 
196 See Roth 2008, p. 60. 
197 Advocate General Darmon’s Opinion in Krantz, para. 5. 
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within the internal market198. The outcome was rather disappointing: the effects that the seizure 
could have on internal market were too remote that free movement law would apply to the 
case.199 The Court stated that even though there remained a possibility for hesitation to sell 
goods on instalment terms by foreign traders to buyers residing in the Netherlands due to the 
Dutch provision, this possibility is “too uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion that a 
national provision authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member States”200 
Roth has pointed out that the outcome by the Court to give priority to the Dutch enforcement 
provisions may suggest that the ranking and priority order among creditors is a matter that 
belongs to jurisdiction of the situs Member State.201 
It seems that the ECJ set a certain threshold of application for Article 34 TFEU in this case, and 
the threshold was not met by the Netherlands legislation in question. This question will be 
reverted to in chapter 5 where the opinion of the advocate general behind the judgment and the 
opinion’s possible implications will be discussed in depth. 
 
3.3 Doctrinal support for a trade barrier in light of Article 34  
 
3.3.1 Some arguments supporting the existence of a trade barrier 
 
Doctrinal support for a trade barrier can be found in literature. Actually, arguments supporting 
a possible infringement of internal market law in a situation of non-recognition and non-
enforcement of foreign property rights have been around since the 1990s. It is important to note 
that at the current moment of the EU’s development, there is nothing to suggest that a positive 
answer to whether a trade barrier, a MEE, could not exist with this issue.202  
According to Affaki, the current security right system in Europe does not go well with the proper 
functioning of the internal market due to the lack of uniformity. Bigger enterprises may engage 
                                                 
198 Case C-69/88, para. 10. 
199 Case C-69/88; Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, pp. 1–3. 
200 Case C-69/88, para. 11. 
201 Roth 2008, p. 60. 
202 See Juutilainen 2015, p. 85. On the other hand, some writers have campaigned for a less inclusive approach to 
the market freedoms. According to de Sousa, the ECJ has extended the scope of the freedoms both explicitly and 
impliedly – nowadays more and more situations are covered by EU law. He further argues that this development is 
instable and lacks a clear normative basis. See de Sousa 2011, pp. 162–163, 168. 
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in expensive due diligence and legal expertise, but smaller companies do not have this option.203 
Weatherill also acknowledges that despite an obvious lack of directly applicable case law, one 
could easily imagine situations in which the question of a possible trade barrier would actualize 
with foreign security rights. According to him, in case a trade barrier would be found, the ECJ 
would be needed to develop a new doctrine obliging Member States to protect foreign security 
interests under their national law. This practice is the same that has happened in the fields of 
environmental protection and consumer protection. As the Court found in Centros, Überseering 
and Inspire Art with regard to recognition of enterprises validly established elsewhere in the 
EU, refusal to recognize a foreign security right might be a trade barrier.204  
This is where Artile 114 TFEU becomes relevant. According to it, the EU is competent to 
impose harmonization acts insofar as the harmonization concerns the establishment and proper 
functioning of the internal market. What is more, there could be competence for the EU to 
harmonize, if and when there is an obstacle to internal trade, such as infringement of the free 
movement of goods or capital. In other words, there is no general competence to harmonize. In 
this case, the harmonization measures taken should aim to improve the proper functioning of 
the internal market by attempting to remove the barrier.205 In this regard, the existence of a trade 
barrier and the discussion of Article 114 TFEU and harmonization are intertwined.206 
Kieninger’s main points concerning Keck and Oosthoek have already been discussed. Roth has 
however gone in the footsteps of Kieninger and argued that non-recognition of validly created 
security right by Member State B may constitute an obstacle or restriction to the import of goods. 
He has viewed this practice in the light of Keck and elaborated the possibility of considering the 
use of retention of title as a “promotion measure” or “selling modality”, which would be 
                                                 
203 Affaki 2006, pp. 197 – 198.  
204 Weatherill 2006, pp. 134–135.  
205 Rutgers 2005, pp. 146–148 .  
206 Rutgers 2008, p. 68. A few scholars have proposed different variations of harmonization measures with regard 
to security rights in Europe. For example, Snijders and Verstijlen have suggested adopting a European security 
right. See Snijders 2006 and Verstijlen 2006. Rank, in turn, has suggested minimal harmonization for European 
security rights. He acknowledges the legal uncertainty and unpredictability brought about by cross-border situations 
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consequence of this: discouragement of potential creditors to extend loan, difficulties to obtain loan and increase 
in transactional costs due to increased credit risk. Rank 2006, pp. 204–206. Rank prefers directives with possibilities 
for Member States to make reservations. The use of directives does not eliminate valuable national differences and 
is a subtler means than the common security right proposed. While the directive should apply equally to both 
domestic and cross-border situations, it should also follow a restrictive and a functional approach so that it focuses 
on the economic functions of the security rights. Rank 2006, pp. 213 – 215.  
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prohibited by the case law of the ECJ in case the national law were discriminatory either de jure 
or de facto.207 He further points out the role of different requirements concerning authorization 
or registration and how they might work as trade restrictions even though they cannot be 
categorized as either measures on the product itself or “certain selling arrangements”.208 Roth, 
too, states the fact that the more exclusively directed at imports the national measure is, the more 
likely it is to constitute a trade barrier in the meaning of Article 34 TFEU. He concludes this 
elaboration by stating that the practice of non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign 
security rights does not seem to fall within the scope of either product requirements or selling 
arrangements, but instead is its own category of potentially trade-restricting MEE’s.209 This 
seems to give additional support for assessing these measures through the market access test. 
Akkermans and Ramaekers have used the concept of mutual recognition to support their 
argument on interconnections between property law and the provisions on free movement of 
goods. According to the doctrine developed already in Cassis de Dijon210, goods that have been 
produced and marketed lawfully in one Member State, should be recognized as valid foreign 
goods and their access to the markets of other Member States should be allowed, without any 
additional requirements that the domestic products do not need to fulfill. Could this rule be 
transferred to property rights? The logic is quite similar to mutual recognition with goods, but 
with property rights on movable objects, it is the right encumbering the movable that encounters 
problems in cross-border setting. Even the European Commission has suggested that it would 
favor extending the rule to other areas in internal market as well, which can be seen from the 
Commission’s White Paper211. This approach can been seen further in the ECJ’s case law on 
qualifications and certifications validly acquired in another Member State.212 
                                                 
207 Roth 2008, p. 49; see also Kieninger 1996b, p. 41, 60. 
208 On national requirements concerning recognition of a foreign professional qualifications, see case C-342/14 X-
Steuerberatungsgesellschaft v. Finanzant Hannover-Nord (2015) ECR I-827 in which the Court stated that when 
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211 White Paper from the Commission to the European Council: Completing the Internal Market, 14 June 1985, 
COM(85) 310 final, p. 22. 
212 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 17–19. They have also argued that it is possible to deviate from the lex rei 
sitae rule at the EU level. See Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 23. An practical example of mutual recognition is 
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3.3.2 Rutgers 
 
Rutgers, too, has a positive view on the question of whether non-recognition and non-
enforcement of foreign retention of title clauses can constitute a trade barrier. Rutgers’ reasoning 
shares some of Kieninger’s arguments, but they have differing views on the role of Keck. While 
Kieninger emphasized Oosthoek’s significance and denied the importance of Keck, Rutgers 
regards Oosthoek as a case that would have been seen in a different light, had it been decided 
after Keck. Moreover, he considers Clinique to be an exceptional ruling in that the Court had to 
handle both selling arrangements and product requirements simultaneously. Therefore, she 
criticizes, it is not the most valid basis for Kieninger to base her arguments.213  
Rutgers has used both the Keck test and access to market test in her argumentation, but prefers 
the market access test. In order to fit the Keck formula, she has defined retention of title clauses 
as “selling and marketing arrangement”. In her examination on whether the lex rei sitae rule 
gives rise to either formal or material discrimination, she ends up with that the rule does not 
result in formal discrimination between imported and domestic products, since the playing 
ground is the same for both. Instead, she finds than a material discrimination indeed takes place, 
if the receiving Member State cannot enforce the foreign retention of title clause due to its type 
being unknown to the respective Member State, in addition to which it cannot be transposed.214  
According to Rutgers, if the rules of the receiving Member State prevent the foreign retention 
of title clause from being enforced, there is a “direct or substantial hindrance to the access of a 
market in that Member State”215. She gives an example, a German seller who cannot enforce a 
verlängerter Eigentumsvorbehalt in the Netherlands and is therefore compelled to opt for more 
                                                 
case C-354/14 Capoda Import-Export (2015) ECR I-658 in which the ECJ repeated the principle that products that 
have been lawfully produced and marketed in some Member State have to be able to be marketed in any other 
Member State without additional controls (para. 40). However, this case concerned the traditional form of mutual 
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is case C-525/14 European Commission v. Czech Republic (2016) ECR I-714. Here, a measure that was equivalent 
to quantitative restrictions could not be justified by consumer protection in a proportionate way. There were less 
means available that would have prejudiced the free movement of goods less than “the general refusal to recognize 
those hallmarks and the additional hallmarking of all precious metals marked with those hallmarks”. See the 
judgment, para. 66. The reasoning in the case bears some obvious similarities to the argumentation presented by 
Akkermans and Ramaekers. 
213 Rutgers 1999, pp. 199–200.  
214 Rutgers 1999, pp. 194–195.  
215 Rutgers 1999, pp. 195 – 196.  
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expensive forms of security. According to her, this situation awakens the “substantial 
hindrance” criteria of the market access test.216 
Juutilainen has criticized Rutgers’ argumentation of her Keck test with proprietary security 
rights. He considers it no material hindrance to internal market, if the receiving Member State 
does not enforce an extended retention of title clause (verlängerter Eigentumsvorbehalt). In 
addition, he states the fact that there is not any obligation to use extended retention of title clause. 
Most countries accept simple retention of title clauses and only few its extended versions.217 
According to Rutgers, retention of title clauses can be protected by the free movement of goods, 
since movement of goods occurs when a chattel is moved from one Member State to another218. 
She finds rules of free movement of goods, services and capital to all be of importance. Later, 
she nevertheless rejects the application of the free movement of services219. However, there she 
considers it an open question whether the doctrine developed with respect to one of the freedoms 
can be analogically applied to other freedoms220. 
On the other hand, Rutgers finds it questionable whether the rules of free movement of capital 
includes the treatment of foreign retention of title clauses. She reasons this view with case 
Société Civile Immobiliére Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie221. The case concerned a 
loan between a Dutch bank and a French company. The loan was secured by a mortgage. The 
company refused to repay the loan to the bank, which resulted in court proceedings in France. 
According to the company, the loan should have been declared void as the Dutch bank lacked 
the required permission by French authorities to vest mortgages. According to the ECJ, banks’ 
practice of granting of mortgage is a service. Furthermore, it was stated that the Treaty 
provisions on services do not apply when a restriction of capital movement relating to such 
transactions is occurring at the same time. Consequently, Rutgers interpreted the ruling 
analogously to retention of title clauses and found that they do not belong to the scope of the 
free movement of capital.222 
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Rutgers provides support for her view to exclude the free movement of capital with decision 
Luisi Carbone223. The case concerned the question of whether remuneration for services belongs 
to the ambit of the free movement of capital or the free movement of services. The ECJ held 
that although the physical transfer of assets is included in the list of various movements of 
capital, the conclusion cannot be drawn that any such transfer would in all circumstances 
constitute a movement of capital. Hence, the physical movement of banknotes does not 
constitute a movement of capital, if the obligation to pay arises from “a transaction involving 
the movement of goods or services”224. Therefore, Rutgers concludes that with a retention of 
title clause, the credit granted by the seller-creditor cannot be considered an investment, but is 
instead ancillary to the sale of goods.225 
 
3.4 Search for the most feasible means to include proprietary security rights in Article 34 
TFEU and grounds for justification 
 
In the previous chapter, the question on institutional and doctrinal support for a possible trade 
barrier with regard to Article 34 TFEU was elaborated. Now, it will be investigated how exactly 
would the negative treatment of foreign retention of title clauses by the national court fit into 
the ambit of the Article. Could the use of extended retention of title clauses be considered 
“certain selling arrangements”, as Kieninger seems to think? Or, could it be seen as an 
“investment arrangement” – a term derived from the Keck doctrine as applied to capital 
movements, particularly investments226? On the other hand, would it be better understood 
through the market access test, so that national measures substantially hindering their use could 
be described as “restrictions on use”227?  
Antonaki has studied Keck with respect to its transferability to the free movement of capital and 
the Golden Shares case law. The ECJ had frequently denied the Member States’ practice of 
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holding certain shares in the Government’s possession in privatised companies by maintaining 
that golden shares are by themselves retsrictions on the free movement of capital in that they 
have the effect of discouraging foreign investors from acquiring shares in these companies. 
However, the Court has not been able to establish a consistent and clear test for a restriction 
apart from the market access approach. The two most relevant categories however seem to be 
positive effect on capital flows and derogation from ordinary company law. The first test can be 
seen to have similarities with the Keck formula in that it might pave the way for distinguishing 
between restrictions on capital movements and investment arrangements: if the State was able 
to show that the secial rights of teh Government both encouraged foreign investors and had a 
positive effect on capital flows, there would not be a prohibited restriction.228 
It is to be noted that this approach by the Court does not leave room for any de minimis test. 
This makes the approach different from the market acess approach that has frequently been used 
with the free movement of capital. This inclusivity also seems to be the underlying cause for 
Antonaki to suggest adoption of the Keck formula.229 
Akkermans and Ramaekers, in turn, have developed the discussion in light of the famous 
Trailers case and its market acess approach. According to them, there are totally five categories 
in which a national measure may fall. The first group is quantitative restrictions which are as 
itself prohibited by Article 34 TFEU and to which national treatment of foreign retention of 
title clauses does not belong. The second option is distinctly applicable measures that are 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions230. This group includes measures that discriminate 
imported goods – or rights – against domestic products either in law or in fact, and it is not 
applicable here either. The third category is product characteristics that apply indistinctly, i.e. 
the object or effect of which is not to favor domestic product over foreign goods231. Neither this 
group is applicable with regard to the treatment of foreign proprietary security rights.232 
The fourth category consists of certain selling arrangements, as developed in Keck233. This is 
also not a category in which the issue at hand could validly be placed. According to Akkermans 
                                                 
228 Antonaki 2016, pp. 181–188.  
229Antonaki 2016, p. 185. 
230 See case Keck, para. 37. 
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and Ramaekers, if a measure does not fit into the requirements of a “certain selling 
arrangement” laid down in Keck, it is a measure with an equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction, i.e. prohibited by Article 34 TFEU. In turn, if it passes the test, it must be further 
assessed whether the measure either prevents or hinders market access. If it does not affect 
market access, it is not prohibited by Article 34.234  
The final category which could include treatment of property rights, includes any other national 
measures hindering the foreign right’s access to the market of Member State B.235 Case 
ANETT236 suggests that the market access is a test of residual character, aimed to catch all 
measures that cannot be categorized otherwise, i.e. by as distinctly applicable measures, certain 
selling arrangements or product characteristics237.  
It seems that the use of market access test by the ECJ has broadened the way for different 
national measures to theoretically find their way to the scope of Article 34 TFEU. The 
interesting thing about the test is that had the Court opted for this approach already in 1990, the 
outcome of Krantz could have been significantly different.238 Similarly, a case similar enough 
to the circumstances of Krantz might be seen as a trade barrier at the current state of EU law. 
There are differences of opinion among scholars on whether a prima facie prohibited national 
measure could however be justified and whether it would succeed the proportionality test239. 
Some, such as Juutilainen, have argued that creditor regimes – public policy or ordre public in 
the respective Member State – provide the strongest ground for justifying the measure in 
accordance with Article 36 TFEU240.  
However, the next and final step is the proportionality test, and some scholars have indeed 
proposed that even if the national measure would succeed with the public policy argument, it 
would most probably fail this test. The test demands that the measure is suitable, necessary and 
proportionate in order to attain its objective –  a measure is only to be applied if no other measure 
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is found that would restrict less the proper functioning of internal market241. According to Roth, 
the suitability test may be the easiest to succeed, as registration requirements and similar 
measures may well be appropriate to pursue the public policy of transparency and publicity. 
However, the tests of necessity and proportionality may be more difficult to satisfy.242 Since 
measures which intrude less with the effective functioning of the internal market than full denial, 
non-recognition and non-enforcement of a foreign proprietary security right can easily be 
imagined, the justification will likely not succeed.243 
 
4 FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND THE RETENTION 
OF TITLE 
 
4.1 Preliminary question: Does Article 63 TFEU have direct effect? 
 
For a private party to invoke Article 63 TFEU, the Article needs to be directly effective. The 
ECJ has indeed ruled in Sanz de Lera that the current Article 63(1) – then 73b(1) EC – was 
directly effective244. Furthermore, in A, the Court set forth that Article 63(1) TFEU “lays down 
a clear and unconditional prohibition for which no implementing measure is needed and which 
confers rights on individuals which they can rely on before the courts”245. The Court further 
elaborated in case A that Article 63(1) TFEU, when used together with Articles 64 and 65 TFEU, 
may be invoked before national courts and may “render national rules that are inconsistent with 
it inapplicable, irrespective of the category of capital movement in question”246. What is more, 
Article 63 TFEU has shown to be positively vertically directly effective, i.e. between a state and 
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a private party247. It is interesting to note that the free movement of capital did not have direct 
effect until 1995, when the Maastricht amendments changed this248. 
 
4.2 Search for institutional support 
 
4.2.1 What does the Treaty say? 
 
The unhampered movement of capital, together with goods, persons and services, is one of the 
four fundamental freedoms in the EU guaranteed by treaty provisions. These freedoms 
constitute the internal market of the EU. Article 63(1) TFEU, the core rule on the free movement 
of capital, prescribes the following: “Within the framework of the provisions set out in this 
Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.” Here, one could easily ask, what the 
Treaty actually means by “capital” and what the free movement of capital de facto covers. 
The Treaty stays silent about the accurate interpretation of '”the movement of capital” in the EU 
context. Instead, it allows Directive 88/361/EEC249, Annex I to determine the meaning. This 
Annex is a list of capital movements to which the ECJ has often resorted. According to this list, 
a movement of capital takes place when “credits related to commercial transactions or to the 
provision of services in which a resident is participating' (item VII) are being used and 'financial 
loans and credits” (item VII) are granted. Further assistance is present in the preamble to the 
list, according to which the concept covers “all the operations necessary for the purposes of 
capital movements: conclusion and performance of the transaction and related transfers”.250  
By virtue of this list, its definitions and the applicable case law, any business transaction 
concerning a monetary credit extended between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a movement 
of capital. It is clear that trans-border investments are under the protection of free movement of 
capital. However, does this also apply to proprietary security rights? The answer is probably 
yes, since item IX of the list expressly includes “sureties, other guarantees and rights of pledge”. 
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4.2.2 The position of case law: What is “a movement of capital”? 
 
There have been a few cases concerning interpretation of the Directive 88/361/EEC. In 
Margarethe Ospelt, the ECJ found that a prior-authorization requirement was not as itself 
contrary to the free movement of capital.251 In Trummer and Mayer, the Court stated that a 
national provision, according to which a mortgage can only be enforced in the domestic 
currency, constitutes a restriction to the movement of capital.252 In Svensson,253 the Court held 
that it is contrary to the free movement of capital that a Member State sets a precondition for 
granting a government aid that the loan that has been extended for the debtor and for the 
repayment of which the state aid is granted, has been extended by a financial institution that has 
its place of establishment in the Member State in question254. 
At least the ECJ has included property law in general in its definition of capital. For example, 
case Commission v. UK demonstrated a movement of capital in investments in real property255. 
Likewise, sale of real property was seen as a movement of capital in case Hollmann v. Fazenda 
Pública (2007)256. What is more, also commercial granting of credit constitutes a capital 
movement, as the ECJ stated in Fidium Finanz AG (2009)257.  
Moreover, AG La Pergola’s opinion in Trummer and Mayer suggests that there is a capital 
movement even when the price is “deferred” so that the vendor grants the deferment to the 
purchaser. In the case, the seller granted the buyer a period within which the repayment had to 
be done. According to AG La Pergola, this transaction constitutes a movement of capital, if this 
transaction can be considered a loan. If the answer is yes, the deferment practice can be regarded 
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as a capital movement.258 The Court did not follow this approach, but as a AG’s opinion, it 
should be taken into account when the state of the law is being clarified259.  
This has a bearing concerning retention of title clauses, in which a deferment of the purchase 
price takes place. If it is acceptable to speak about a loan with regard to the use of instalment 
terms applied with regard to retention of title clauses, does this then mean that, according to the 
opinion, there is a capital movement? 
 
4.3 Doctrinal support: Arguments proposed by scholars 
 
4.3.2 Roth’s argumentation 
 
How can a claim of retention of title clauses constituting a capital movement, be justified? 
Indeed, what makes Roth different from Kieninger, Rutgers, Akkermans and Ramaekers in this 
debate is his decision to include the issue within the framework of free movement of capital. 
According to Roth, despite the non-abundance of directly applicable case law, the present state 
of EU law can be assumed to be that the internal market freedoms apply to national provisions 
of private substantive law in case these provisions hinder cross-border movement of goods or 
capital. This kind of hindrance is likely to actualize when import of services or goods is made 
less attractive to the importer by the national mandatory provisions and their use.260  
Roth connects proprietary security rights and movements of capital. According to him, the 
freedom of capital exceeds also to security rights which are attached to assets, such as a 
retention of title clause. A capital movement occurs already when a trans-border collateral is 
created as part of a loan agreement261. When the parties to a secured transaction are from 
different Member States, Roth argues, a cross-border movement of capital takes place. This, in 
turn, is where Article 63 becomes relevant. He argues that the scope of Article 63 (1) indeed 
involves cross-border security transactions when the parties to this transaction are residing in 
different jurisdictions or when a movable object bearing a security value is moved from one 
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jurisdiction to another. According to Roth, a movement of capital takes place and is under an 
infringement when the destination state does not recognize or enforce a foreign security right.262 
It can thus be concluded that also secured transactions in a cross-border setting between a 
creditor and a security-provider debtor form a capital transaction. When this legal relation 
actualizes so that either the debtor complies with the payment schedule accordingly or defaults 
the payment, the consequence of which is the creditor’s right to recover the payment, a 
movement of capital takes place.263  
 
4.3.3 Von Wilmowsky 
According to von Wilmowsky, proprietary security rights that are being used in connection with 
forms of acquisition credit are protected by both Articles 34 and 63 TFEU. He draws this from 
his notion that there are two types of security transactions, the ones which depend on their 
underlying transaction and the ones that are independent. With regard to dependent transactions, 
the creation of a security right belongs to the scope of one of the four freedoms if the underlying 
legal relationship belongs to the scope of one of the four freedoms264. A retention of title is based 
on a sales agreement which then has to belong to the ambit of one of the freedoms265.   
With regard to the transactions dependent on the underlying legal relation, von Wilmowsky states 
that they belong to the scope of the free movement of goods if the aim of the transaction is to 
secure payment of the purchase price, in addition to which they belong to the scope of the free 
movement of capital. Then again, with respect to the category of independent transactions, there 
is a group of proprietary security rights that are only protected by free movement of capital. 
These are rights that have been granted together with a loan or which are independent of the 
transaction on which the security right is based.266 
According to Von Wilmowsky, retention of title can be categorized within the free movement of 
capital. However, he mainly bases his argument on what can be interpreted based on the official 
                                                 
262 Roth 2008, pp. 50–51.  
263 Von Wilmowsky 1999, pp. 36–38.  
264 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 77. 
265 Von Wilmowsky 1996, p. 82. 
266 Von Wilmowsky 1996, pp. 77–93. 
 66 
 
EU documents. As was stated before, the Treaty and its supporting documents can be seen to 
leave space for retention of title clauses to be included in the ambit of Article 63 TFEU. 
 
4.4  Is the doctrine on free movement of goods and proprietary security rights 
transferable to the field of capital? 
 
4.4.1 Application of free movement of capital together with free movement of goods 
 
Free movement of capital seems to have an overlap with other market freedoms. In Casati, the 
Court indeed stated: “- - freedom to move certain types of capital is, in practice, a precondition 
for the effective exercise of other freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular the right of 
establishment267.” On the other hand, the Court has usually relied on this argumentation with 
certain market freedoms, namely free movement of establishment and services268. The free 
movement of capital has also been subject to other free movement provision prevailing it, which 
happened in case Anica Milivojevic269. In this case, the restrictions that the national measure 
caused on the free movement of capital were merely a consequence of restrictions on the free 
movement of services, which moved the argumentation to cover only Article 56 TFEU270. 
How does free movement of capital then go in conjunction with free movement of goods? The 
ECJ gave a ruling on both the free movement of goods and the free movement of capital in case 
ED Srl v. Italo Fenocchio271 which concerned national legislation on procedure for obtaining 
summary payment orders. The Court found that a national legislation that prevented recource to 
the procedure for obtaining summary payment orders in situations where service on the debtor 
is to be effected in another Member State, was not contrary to the free movement of goods272. 
This was because – as was the case with Krantz – the possibility that there would be an effect 
on internal trade was too indirect and uncertain. Once again, the question was of whether there 
would be hesitation by the national traders to sell goods to purchasers that were established 
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elsewhere in the EU273. Moreover, the national procedural provision did not form a restriction 
on the freedom to make payments due to its procedural nature274. 
 
4.4.2 Application of free movement of capital, only 
 
Then again, the Court’s case law has identified certain types of national measure, where only 
Article 63 TFEU can apply. In case Konle, the Court stated that property purchase and 
investment are to be seen through movement of capital, and only it275. In turn, currency and 
other financial transactions were demonstrated as solely a capital movement in Bordessa and 
others276. Loans277 have been seen as a mere capital movement, as well as certain kind of 
investments278. From these types of capital movement, property purchase and loans seem to bear 
the most resemblance to selling arrangements with retention of title as a proprietary security 
right, even though the property in question in Konle was real property, land, and the loan at hand 
in the applicable case law was granted by a financial institution279. 
 
4.4.3 On interconnections between Articles of 34 and 63 TFEU 
 
Article 63(1) TFEU prohibits both directly and indirectly discriminatory national measures 
similarly to Article 34 TFEU. What is even more important, is that the Article also prohibits 
non-discriminatory national measures which hinder access to the Member State B’s market.280  
Cases on indirect discrimination of the free movement of capital include mostly cases 
concerning tax rules that have a de facto discriminative effect on non-residents.281 For instance, 
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in case Hollman, Portuguese law entitled the residents of Portugal to lower rate of capital gains 
tax than non-residents. The Court considered the measure a breach of Article 63(1) TFEU which 
Portugal could not justify.282  
The Court has gradually embraced a more substantial form of the obstacle to free movement of 
capital. Instead of a pure discrimination or even indirect inequality, the ECJ has found national 
measures that “create and obstacle” or “restrict” capital movements enough to satisfy the 
prohibition in Article 63(1). For example, in Commission v. Portugal, the Court stated that even 
measures that do not, as themselves, cause unequal treatment, but which however make it less 
favorable for foreign investors to engage in investing capital in undertakings situated in the host 
Member State, are included in the scope of Article 63(1) TFEU283. Nevertheless, similarly to 
free movement of goods, if there is no substantial impediment, Article 63(1) TFEU has not been 
breached.284 A quite similar reasoning was present in cases Lenz285and Commission v. France, 
in which the Court stated that measures which create obstacles or otherwise make it less 
attractive for nationals of other Member States to exercise free movement of capital and 
establishment, were prohibited by Article 63(1) TFEU286. 
The mentioned approach by the Court sounds rather similar to the language used with regard to 
Article 34 TFEU and the market access test. The market access approach of other market 
freedoms’ case law has indeed been followed in the field of capital in the Golden Share 
judgments.287 An example of this is case Commission v. UK in which the Court held that non-
discriminatory measures hindering access to the market were in breach with free movement of 
capital288. The Court found it not relevant that the national rules applied equally to residents and 
non-residents, but that they nevertheless “were liable to deter investors from other Member 
States from making such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market”289. 
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What is significant to note here, is that the ECJ has argued with a kind of “de minimis” rule also 
in the field of capital movements. Namely, in case Graf, the Court developed a rule known as 
“too uncertain and indirect”. When this rule applied, there would be no breach of Article 63(1) 
TFEU.290This judgment will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 5. 
This approach – market access together with some institutional support for a possible de minimis 
threshold – means a close link between the two freedoms. If market access test can be applied 
to both free movement of goods and capital, searching for an applicable de minimis threshold 
from the Court’s case law on the test bears significance not only for the question of possible 
breach of Article 34, but also on what the threshold could be with Article 63(1).  
Moreover, numerous scholars have acknowledged that the principles and tests that are 
applicable to some internal market freedom, have pretty much converged since the 1990’s. Cruz 
has approached the free movement provisions as a whole. He argues that the ECJ has been trying 
to establish a uniform interpretation of the rules concerning free movement.291 According to 
Cruz, everything implies that it should be possible to adopt a single test and even a single free 
movement norm.292 He states that since the consequences of different free movement provisions 
are almost identical, it is increasingly irrelevant to classify situations as belonging to just one of 
the four freedoms293. I do not believe in the possibility of a single norm, but a single test, namely 
market access, would not be a far-fetched option in the light of the current EU law. 
According to Mortelmans, it is apparent in the light of the Court’s case law that there is a clear 
direction towards convergence in the tests and principles governing the freedoms. The existing 
differences between the interpretation and application of the freedoms are partly due to the fact 
that the Court has not had an opportunity to extend its case law.294 The ECJ has even explicitly  
acknowledged the converging possibility between the free movement of capital and the free 
movement of services and establishment. Verkooijen295 was an interesting decision in that even 
though the case concerned the current Article 63 TFEU, the Court made references to its case 
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law on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services. In Futura,296the Court 
supported a case with the free movement of services with its case law on the free movement of 
goods and the freedoms of establishment.297  
Even though the convergence may not be perfect and it is still unclear how for example Keck 
and Trailers would apply to free movement of capital, there are grounds for justification of the 
converging trend. For example, Jansson and Kalimo have pointed out the difficulty in 
differentiating goods from services in practice. They further state that application of a more 
generic approach to EU internal market law would have positive effects on legal certainty. 
However, the de minimis tests may not always be identical, and therefore context-specific 
analysis has to be taken into account.298  
 
4.4.4 Change in the substance area – analogy from investments and tax case law to proprietary 
security rights? 
 
On the other hand, an important question arises: how much analogy could reasonably be drawn 
from case law on foreign investments and tax treatment to the field of movable proprietary 
security rights?299 Albeit this is not an easy question, some similarities can be found. As 
Kieninger has argued, non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign retention of title clauses 
can substantially hinder the seller from carrying out his business in a profitable way in the 
Member State in question. It can work as an obstacle for him to extend his business in this 
Member State or even lead him to stop trading there altogether. This argumentation resembles 
the manner in which the Court has reasoned its judgments concerning investments – good 
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examples of this are cases Commision v. UK, Commission v. France and Commission v. 
Portugal mentioned above.  
When it comes to taxation, the ECJ concluded in Sandoz300 that a mere imposition of a stamp 
duty of 0,8 percent on loans from other Member States as well as domestic loans constituted a 
restriction on the free movement of capital even though the national measure in question did not 
amount to discrimination.301 This was because, according to the Court, this prevented “residents 
from benefiting from the absence of taxation” which might take place with loans “imported” 
from elsewhere, and was therefore “likely to deter such residents from obtaining loans from 
persons established in other Member States”302. The way I see it, there is potential for analogy 
from the argument of absence of taxation to the absence of provisional requirements concerning 
third-party effectiveness of a retention of title clause. 
What is more, Article 63 TFEU has often been considered breached when a State has set special 
authorization requirements for foreign investors303. This can be compared to the non-recognition 
of foreign retention of title clauses as a result of the host state having set special preconditions 
for a valid security right against third parties which the foreign seller has not fulfilled. 
 
4.5 Conclusions and application to the case “Y GmbH vs. Finland” 
 
It seems that the free movement of goods as a fundamental freedom of the internal market may 
offer a somewhat better protection for different proprietary rights than free movement of capital. 
When free movement of goods is concerned, the ECJ’s argumentation in Trailers and 
subsequent case law leads the way with the most feasible means to include proprietary security 
rights within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. This is since the market access test can be seen to 
hold a lot broader set of national means than its previous competitors, the Dassonville formula 
and Keck doctrine. What is significant, is that the ECJ has also applied the market access test to 
Article 63(1). Therefore, there are valid grounds to extend the use of the market access test from 
the field of goods to capital movements, at least when done carefully. This will have significant 
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consequences for to the next chapter, where different thresholds of the market access approach 
will be elaborated with regard to the national treatment of foreign retention of title clauses. 
In case “Y GmbH v. Finland”, Y GmbH can invoke and rely on both Articles 34 and 63 TFEU 
as they have both been shown by the ECJ to be directly effective. It is also important that there 
is not only doctrinal, but also institutional support for including proprietary security rights into 
the scope of Article 63 TFEU. However, there seem to be slightly stronger grounds for Article 
34 to include the treatment of foreign retention of title clauses than Article 63 TFEU304. One of 
these reasons is that the latter Article has generally been invoked only together with another 
provision of EU law, as solely capital movements have usually concerned clearly financial 
transactions between a professional financial institution and a company. Retention of title 
transactions seem to lack this “sophistication” to be deemed only in light of Article 63 TFEU. 
Therefore, I consider it a well-founded opinion that, in case a scenario similar to my practice 
case came before the ECJ, the Court would argue its ruling with both Articles. The question of 
which Article could actually “succeed”, will be more closely investigated in chapter 6.
                                                 
304 See, for example, Juutilainen 2015, p. 93–94.  
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PART II  
“If the market access approach comes with such a threshold, the arguments presented in the aftermath of Krantz - - then support 
the view that the threshold may be met in the case of treatment of foreign proprietary security rights.”305 
 
5. DE MINIMIS IN THE LAW OF CAPITAL – A PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERDISCIPLINARY VALUE? 
 
5.1 The principle of de minimis from EU competition law to EU internal market law?  
 
De minimis is a solid principle in EU competition law. Can the borders between different fields 
of EU law be flexible in a way that this principle could have significance in free movement 
freedoms? Juutilainen has noted that it is an open question if the market access approach 
includes a threshold of application and what this threshold would exactly be306. I will, indeed, 
examine the question of whether the principle of de minimis could be transferable to the field of 
EU free movement law. Even though the Court has stated that the principle does not exceed to 
the area of internal market freedoms307, the Court’s jurisprudence on market access leaves a lot 
to be questioned. I will bring forward the many instances in which the Court has used a similar 
language compared to a de minimis test. In these cases, existence of a certain de minimis 
threshold seems to be present, regardless of whether the Court admits this or not.  
The ECJ has not set a de minimis rule on Articles 34 or 63 TFEU. On the other hand, the Court 
has confirmed that, for an existence of a MEE, a mere hypothetical or causally indirect – 
ambiguous or remote – possibility to hinder import is not enough308. Could it be that there is an 
implicit threshold – a kind of de minimis – in the market access test? According to Frenz, who 
has a highlighted competition law perspective, there is no de minimis threshold in fundamental 
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freedoms, since even measures that only restrict the market in a minimal way or even 
theoretically, are in the ambit of the Articles. 309 
Akkermans and Ramaekers acknowledge the possibility that there could be a preliminary de 
minimis test hiding in the logic of the market access test. According to them, the second test for 
certain selling arrangements – whether it has effects on market access – includes evaluation of 
whether it substantially hinders access to the market of Member State B. In this regard, they 
point out that even though the Court has traditionally denied having a de minimis requirement 
in connection with internal market freedoms, there would be no point in the market access test, 
if it did not contain any threshold as this would lead to the scope of market hindering-measures 
being overly broad.310 Spaventa, has also stated that there has always been a tendency to qualify 
the market access test as having a threshold of application, below which national provisions or 
other measures would not need justification, but would as itself be outside the scope of Article 
34 TFEU – much the same way as in EU competition law. This threshold would either be called 
de minimis or “substantial hindrance” to market access.311 
AG Jacobs has suggested criteria for a threshold in his opinion of Leclerc-Siplec312. He had very 
similar argument with Akkermans and Ramaekers in that pure application of the market access 
test would potentially capture the amount of national measures that is too wide. As a 
consequence, he went on to suggest a criteria that when the measure restricts access to the 
market “substantially”, it belongs to the ambit of Article 34 TFEU and requires justification by 
the Member State in question.313 
The ECJ held in its famous Trailers case that “a prohibition on the use of a product - - has a 
considerable influence on the behavior of consumers, which, in its turn, affects the access of 
that product to the market of that Member State.”314 The reasoning very much sounds like 
acknowledging a threshold in the test. Barnard has discussed how to put together the clear use 
of a threshold and the Court’s older case law which shows a clear reluctance to acknowledge 
that there is a de minimis threshold in free movement of goods. She suggests that there might 
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indeed not have been a threshold in distinctly applicable measures and cases concerning product 
requirements, i.e. the cases following the Cassis judgment. Instead, the threshold criteria was 
established when the market access test was introduced.315 
Actually, AG Van Gerven already suggested application of a concrete test in 1989 in Torfaen316 
concerning the free movement of goods. He stated that in case the national measure “merely 
increases the difficulty in penetrating the national market”, the free movement of goods can be 
applied only when it “appears from the entire economic and legal context that the economic 
interweaving of national markets sought by the Treaty is thereby threatened317”. Even though 
the ECJ did not incorporate Van Gerven’s ideas into its decisions in either Torfaen or Keck, the 
approach left an academical mark. Some, such as Mortelmans, have however criticized the 
approach of being too broad318. 
The de minimis test has been a success in competition law, which speaks for that it might have 
advantages also in the area of free movement.319 There are valid grounds for convergence 
between these two fields of EU economic law. One of these grounds is to ensure that EU law 
functions effectively.320Furthermore, competition and free movement rules are based on the 
same objectives, to facilitate the proper functioning of the trade and economy within the EU.321 
On the other hand, the converging trend of de minimis has been criticized and it has been stated 
that the ECJ should still refrain from using the de minimis tests or at least reject this use. The 
problem with the test is that it would be challenging to apply in practice and there is risk for the 
rulings to become intuitive, which in turn would be a threat to legal certainty.322 All in all, there 
can be distinguished three categories of de minimis thresholds used by the Court. They all have 
the same aim, to exclude those measures outside application of the Articles that do not have the 
“substantial” effect required. The three tests are sometimes difficult to differentiate from each 
other, but certain characteristics can be found.323 
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5.2 Magnitude de minimis: the restriction is not severe enough  
 
Magnitude may be the most common form of de minimis tests. It means a negligible restrictive 
effect, the substantial hindrance to internal market.324 The magnitude of a measure can even be 
seen from the language that the Court has used. For instance, there is a prima facie obstacle, if 
investments are “deterred”325 or “discouraged” 326. The ECJ has expressly stated that there is no 
de minimis test concerning the magnitude of the restriction in the free movement law. However, 
this is mainly because the Court’s case law was previously focused on discrimination cases.327 
The magnitude of the restrictive effect can be seen in three instances. First, it can refer to the 
size of the market that has been restricted. This test therefore permits those measures which 
have effects only to local markets or that only affect a limited number of goods or traders. On 
the other hand, the ECJ has been quite inconsistent here as it has stated in Ditley Bluhme328 that 
there can still be a prima facie prohibited measure even if it only affects minimal part of the EU 
market329. The second magnitude test can be called market share de minimis: if there is 
restriction on a substantial part of the relevant market330. Then again, the third instance of 
magnitude can be seen as the individual effect de minimis: the effect on individual traders is 
small331. Nevertheless, the “smallness” would be questionable as the threshold would be set in 
accordance with the highest restrictive effect proven among the individual traders.332 
                                                 
324 Nevertheless, some have suggested that the threshold could be even as high as close to 100 %: an almost 
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Transposed to the field of free movement freedoms and proprietary security rights – and in 
particular, retention of title clauses – the magnitude tests could mean that a restriction which 
only affects the use of a retention of title between the respective Member State and one another 
country would be permitted. This would fulfill at least two of the tests above. First, the effect 
would probably only affect those traders that use retention of title clauses, and namely their 
extended versions. Second, only a relative share of the EU-wide relevant market – the trade with 
certain kind of objects, such as machines used in sawmill industry – would be affected because 
not all of this trade takes place between the two Member States in question.  
Of course, this is a question of how the relevant markets are defined: if the relevant market is 
narrow, restriction of a magnitude effect is more likely to take place. In competition law, 
relevant markets are divided into geographical and product markets. Product market is defined 
by the products that are interchangeable with one another, whereas geographical market 
concerns the issue of where, for example between which Member States, the interchangeable 
products are marketed. Interchangeability is detected by a 5–10 % increase in price – if this 
increase makes the buyer favor the seller’s more inexpensive competitor with sufficiently 
similar product, the products are on the same market. When it comes to demand for specialized 
products, such as those used in sawmill industry, the market may be narrow.333  
Moreover, it is questionable whether the effects on individual traders would be small – this 
would at least be contrary to what Rutgers, Kieninger and Roth have argued. On the other hand, 
as Juutilainen has stated, no one forces German traders to use extended clauses. The foreign 
trader could – at least in theory – perfectly well be satisfied to use simple clauses. Then again, 
if it is the economic function of the extended clause that he is dependent on, he could choose 
some other form of pledge that fulfills this function and is at least transposable in other States.  
It is an open question whether the three magnitude sub-tests are cumulative or whether only one 
of them is enough to make the national measure not prohibited.334 I cannot state for certain 
whether the situation in my practice case could fit in all the magnitude tests because of the 
possible narrowness of the relevant market and the effect on an individual trader. In case the 
markets were defined in a wider sense and the effect on an individual buyer were seen minimal, 
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the situation would remain under the magnitude-related de minimis threshold and not be prima 
facie prohibited. On the other hand, in case of wider markets and not minimal effects on traders, 
the cumulative application of the tests would fail and the magnitude de minimis would not apply. 
What is more, the result of a non-recognition policy could potentially have severe consequences 
so that the effects would not be limited to only one other Member State. This could also make 
the effect’s magnitude far from minimal, and hence, the restrictive measure itself prohibited.  
All in all, the magnitude test with its three sub-tests and profound technical nature derived from 
competition law is rather difficult to transfer to the area of state-imposed practice that might 
have restrictive effects on internal trade. Consequently, I will next examine the two better-suited 
tests: causality- and probability-based de minimis thresholds. 
 
5.3 Causality-based de minimis: the effects are too remote 
 
5.3.1 Cases falling “on the perimeter” of Article 34 TFEU 
 
Even though there was originally no de minimis threshold in connection to Article 34 – or 63 – 
TFEU, the ECJ seems to have done exceptions in its case law even before the era of the market 
access test. These exceptions, namely use of a remoteness test, were applied to cases which fall 
far from the obvious application schemes of the free movement Articles and which do not 
exactly deal with traditional trading rules.335 The causality-based threshold includes also cases 
that do not deal with trading rules in the narrow sense of the term336. Treatment of foreign 
proprietary security rights clearly seems to belong to this category. 
Another example of cases falling on the perimeter of free movement of goods law is patents. 
AG La Pergola suggested a de minimis test in his opinion in BASF.337 There, he restates the 
“too uncertain and indirect” rule that had already been used in Krantz.  After that, he goes on to 
explain the causality-based de minimis rule: “- - the object of the principle  recalled here, laid 
down in the Dassonville judgment, is always to verify whether a causal link exists — it does not 
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in this particular case — between the national measure concerned and the pattern of imports.” 
La Pergola then states the fact that (the current) Article 34 TFEU does not, at least explicitly, 
include a de minimis rule. Because of this, he states, all the Article requires is an obstacle to 
trade, even if it is a minor one. Nevertheless, for there to be even a minimal obstacle, there needs 
to be a causal link.338 On the other hand, if a direct causality is found between the measure and 
the effects on market access, there is evidence of a prima facie restriction on free movement339. 
Jansson and Kalimo have questioned the applicability of the criteria of direct causality to 
national measures that prohibit optimal means of advertising. This kind of measure could fall 
under the causality threshold even though it would most certainly have effects on business 
performance. If the measure were assessed only through causality and directness of the effects, 
it could remain permissible even though its magnitude and probability could still be high.340  
AG Tesauro has elaborated the requirements for directness and unhypotheticality of the effects 
on internal market in his opinion to case Hünermund341. The national measure in question was 
a marketing arrangement for products, whose effects on imports and demand were hypothetical 
and indirect and did not thus trigger the market access test.342According to Tesauro, Article 34 
TFEU was to be interpreted as not prohibiting “pharmacists from advertising quasi-
pharmaceutical products outside the pharmacy343” as the advertising arrangement did not have 
direct connection with imports and was not able to hinder internal trade.344  
This is a problem that would touch the area of proprietary security rights and even retention of 
title, as they have even been defined as selling and marketing arrangements by Kieninger and 
Rutgers. On the other hand, there is a possibility that this is not what “directness” actually means 
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– it could be that a measure could be seen as “direct” for the mere reason that it prevents market 
access, even if this takes place gradually over time.345 
 
5.3.2 Could the threshold be seen as the amount of “if”-scenarios? Krantz revisited 
 
Krantz, one of the most important cases with regard to my topic, was given long before the ECJ 
had given its leading case Trailers concerning the market access test in free movement of goods. 
Here, the Court seemed to apply both the probability test and the causality-based de minimis 
test. As was stated previously, the Dutch provision in question was deemed “too uncertain and 
indirect”, and the substantial question itself was kind of dismissed. 346 Indeed, Krantz was the 
first case in which the doctrine of “effect too uncertain and indirect” was mentioned347. 
However, a slightly different and a lot more insightful interpretation can be drawn from AG 
Darmon’s opinion in Krantz. Even though the Court ended up with the same conclusion in 
Krantz, the path was different. Darmon begins by explaining a possible way of reasoning. First, 
it needs to be explored whether there are “perceptible effects on imports”348. I choose to call this 
inquiry the first test. Second, focus needs to be directed at the national provisions that result in 
these effects: do they reflect a legitimate objective or are the effects disproportionate? I shall 
call this the second test. Nevertheless, he points out, this investigation presupposes answering 
the question of whether there indeed are “perceptible effects on imports” (the first test). In his 
opinion, the situation in Krantz, or more specifically the Netherlands legislation in question, 
lacks the sufficient effects.349 In other words, the circumstances in Krantz fail the first test. 
Darmon’s main thesis is that there are simply too many “if”-scenarios taking place for the 
national legislation to be taken to the second test. This is why the second test – investigation of 
the compatibility of the national provisions with the effects on internal market – is not needed. 
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He concludes this saying that “the compatibility of the national measure with Article 30 (now 
34) is shown quite simply by the absence of any bearing on imports”350.  
Darmon goes on to explain his conclusion. First, the scope of the national provision is limited 
so that does not include stocks. According to Darmon, this is a factor that speaks for the idea 
that the national legislation is not meant to cover situations with internal market.351 Second, he 
points out that the Netherlands law “has no effect on the volume of demand from buyers on 
instalment terms”. With this, he refers to retention of title clauses. Darmon considers the only 
possible effect for imports to be the negative impact on foreign sellers who use instalment terms 
and might therefore hesitate to enter into an agreement with a buyer who is subject to the direct 
taxation system of the Netherlands.352 
After this, Darmon emphasizes that the lastly mentioned possible reluctance is of “merely 
hypothetical character”.353 This is the first “if”: foreign sellers might establish means to cover 
their increased risk and costs354. Moreover, he continues, such reluctance is only relatable to the 
materialization of an event that is uncertain.355 This is the uncertainty of the event. The second 
and third “if” can be seen to form from the way Darmon further divides this uncertainty. He 
explains two accounts on which this shows. First, – the second “if” – is the fact that the risk of 
seizure by Netherlands tax authorities concerning objects sold on instalment terms to a 
Netherlands buyer actualizes only when the debtor defaults his direct tax debts. Second option 
in which the uncertainty of the event actualizes – the third “if” – is if the competent national 
authorities make the decision to solve the situation and both domestic sellers and sellers from 
other Member States are treated equally.356 There cannot be a measure of equivalent effect, if 
there is no effect to start with.357  
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What is even more considerable in the opinion, is Darmon’s reasoning at the end. Indeed, he 
continues by saying: “That conclusion might perhaps have required reconsideration if - - the 
national legislation had also applied to stocks, since the possibility of effects on trade arising 
out of a greater degree of 'reluctance' could not then have been ruled out”.358  
Finally, Darmon elaborates the possibility for a national provision to be of such nature that it 
could potentially give rise to effects on imports, but that it might still not produce these effects 
in the circumstances at hand. It cannot be known a priori whether abolition of certain national 
measures might eventually enable imports to increase. 359 He concludes this idea by stating that 
the Court’s case law gives rise to the possibility that in certain circumstances legislation can be 
considered to not have influence on imports, when that legislation actually bears some effects 
(“is not totally without effects”). The same interpretation has to be extended to measures, the 
restrictive effect of which, be it actual or potential, merely happens to be undetectable.360  
Does the end of the opinion mean that there could have been these “undetectable” effects on 
imports in Krantz? At least, it can be drawn from Darmon’s reasoning that were there less “if-
scenarios” in the case, the outcome could have been different. It is not sure, however, how many 
uncertainties should have been removed for the threshold of Article 34 TFEU to be applicable.  
It has been argued that the reasoning by AG Darmon gives rise to further questions: if the seller-
creditor in Germany, for instance, cannot rely on retention of title as a feasible practice and 
therefore demands a more expensive security, would this then constitute “discernible restriction 
to trade”? The seller might have been able to sell his products at a lower cost, which is now 
watered down and hence, the possible competitive advantage is lost.361 I would carefully assume 
the answer to likely be no, since there would still be much uncertainty. For example, the question 
of losing a competitive edge would be difficult to show, and the situation would still face the 
same risk of being of hypothetical character.362 
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Some scholars believe that in a broader setting than in Krantz, the Court could likely give its 
interpretation on the treatment of foreign proprietary security rights. Akkermans and Ramaekers 
believe that in a broader context the Dutch legislation might in fact constitute a trade barrier: 
while foreign sellers would be compelled to use more costly security rights, such as a letter of 
credit, domestic creditors would not have this need.363 They further believe that a case with 
circumstances resembling Krantz is bound to encounter the ECJ soon enough, in which situation 
Article 34 TFEU would be applicable. According to them, the Member State in question would 
probably not be able to justify the measure and succeed the proportionality test.364  
However, the question remains, has the ECJ not dealt with other cases concerning proprietary 
security rights after Krantz? They propose a few possible answers. One possibility, according 
to Akkermans and Ramaekers, is that most Member States recognize a quite similar set of 
property rights – numerus clausus – at least when it comes to their purpose. The third option is 
that parties could choose an international form of security in expensive cross-border business.365  
Second option is that, as the Court was so overly cautious in Krantz and since there is very little 
European activity in this area, the ECJ would refrain from putting itself in a situation where it 
has to make this fundamental decision.366 Second possibility, in turn, for the lack of case law 
could be Krantz working as acte clairé: a previous ruling on a matter makes it unnecessary for 
a national court – even the court of highest instance – to seek a preliminary ruling on the same 
matter.367 However, it is to be noted that following a previous precedent does not equal to using 
analogy. Whereas analogical reasoning consists of finding similarities between different 
circumstances, the supposed obligation to follow an earlier precedent may flat out cease the 
possibility to assess the new circumstances in new light, particularly if the previous decision 
was given a long time ago. The law evolves and old precedents can be overruled368.  
In fact, the ECJ does not adhere strictly to the doctrine of binding precedent (stare decisisis), 
even though it has overruled a previous precedent only few times. Overruling has taken place 
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when the previous interpretation has been with error, when the earlier precedent did not work 
or when the overall evolution of the EU has made the ruling unfit to the EU’s present state. Keck 
is a good example of unworkability, since the division of measures into two separate categories 
introduced by it did not clarify the notion of a MEE, but actually made the contrary369. It is 
possible that the evolution of the EU law and a later discovery of a previous and erroneous 
interpretation would result in an overruling of Krantz.370 
 
5.4 Probability de minimis: the effects are too hypothetical 
 
The probability is quite close to the causality test in that the both deal with “too uncertain” 
national measures. However, probability threshold is more focused on the degree of 
hypotheticality of the possible effects than their remoteness371. In other words, causality-based 
threshold tackles measures which might well have effects on internal trade, but the effects are 
too indirect, while the probability threshold focuses on perhaps non-existent measures.372 
In a de minimis test based on probability, the Court assesses whether the restrictive effect which 
is caused by the national measure is too uncertain373. Sometimes an additional test, a 
“hypothetical event test” has to be taken as well, since the (uncertain) effect may be subject to 
a circumstance or an event that itself is uncertain.374 Krantz is a good example of this kind of 
reasoning. The effects on internal market were dependent on whether traders in other Member 
States would refrain – hypothetical assumption, to start with – from selling to Dutch buyers due 
to the, as itself, hypothetical possibility that, first, the buyer would be a defaulting tax debtor 
and second, the seller’s products would become subject to seizure by the tax authorities.  
                                                 
369 See Head 2015, p. 36. 
370 Tridimas 2012, pp. 307, 323–325.  
371 See case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e. V. v. Yves Rocher GmbH (1993) ECR I-
02361, paras. 21–22.  
372 Jansson – Kalimo 2014, p. 541 and 544. 
373 See case case C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzov v. Republic of Austria (1997) ECR I-2637, paras. 16, 18–19, where 
the Court found that a mere hypothetical possibility for a person to use his free movement is not sufficient to 
establish a connection with EU law. Hence, the provisions on the free movement of persons were not applicable. 
374 Jansson – Kalimo 2014, p. 546. 
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In Graf375, the Court applied the hypothetical event test and thus made Article 63 TFEU 
inapplicable to the national provision in question. The case concerned an Austrian legislation 
according to which workers did not have right to compensation upon termination of employment 
if the worker himself ended the contract. According to the Court, the possibility that a contract 
could be terminated by reasons “not attributable to him” – as there would be compensation then 
– was not probable enough for the legislation to form a prohibited obstacle376. 
However, there are cases in which the Court has not applied the hypothetical event test even 
though the event has been hypothetical. KPN and TPG377 concerned the free movement of 
capital and the “golden shares” that would give the government special shareholder rights to 
veto even economically proper decisions. The ECJ ended up finding even the risk of the 
government’s use of its veto rights sufficient for an restriction to free movement of capital as it 
discouraged investors378. Hence, the threshold was met, despite its clear hypotheticality.379 
The outcome of KPN and TPG is interesting, since the Court could have chosen the approach it 
had embraced in Krantz and Graf – that the possible difficulties encountered by third persons 
when they tried to acquire shares was dependent on the hypothetical event that the government 
might use its veto right380. I cannot help seeing the logic of AG Darmon in the Court’s decision 
to favor cross-border investments in this case. Darmon indeed stated in Krantz that had the 
Dutch provision applied to stocks as well, it would probably have succeeded to the second test, 
i.e. to the actual assessment of the measure’s effects on internal trade. This might pave the way 
for the treatment of foreign retention of title clauses to be included in the free movement of 
capital – with the significant precondition that the rights derived from these devices were first 
characterized as a capital movement. 
 
                                                 
375 Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH (2000) ECR 493. 
376 Case Graf, paras. 24–25. See also Barnard 2013, pp. 146–147 and Jansson – Kalimo 2014, pp. 546–547.  
377 Joined cases C-282 & 283/04 Commission v. Netherlands (KPN and TPG) (2006) ECR I-9141. 
378 Case KPN and TPG, paras 20–28.  
379 Vogel 2015, p. 269. See also this thesis, pp. 57–58.  
380 Jansson – Kalimo 2014, p. 547. 
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PART III 
”As private international law is a field heavily dominated by legal theory in such a way that theory rather than 
legislation is considered guiding for the resolution of conflict of law situations, a change in theory should be viewed 
as a change in legislation.”381 
 
6. TO BE OR NOT TO BE: THE SEARCH FOR A CONCRETE 
THRESHOLD IN THE FICTIONAL CASE   
 
It was concluded in the part II of this thesis that the market acccess test can indeed be seen to 
have certain thresholds of application. However, the question is whether the restriction to free 
movement of goods/capital brought about by non-recognition and non-enforcement of a foreign 
retention of title clause exceeds this thresholds or not. If it does exceed the threshold, it could 
constitute an infringement to internal market. As was shown previously in this thesis, the ECJ 
has defined the threshold as being relatively high. Therefore, if the situation in my case “Y 
GmbH vs. Finland” stays under the threshold, it cannot be seen to significantly hinder 
competition or marketing practices between companies in the internal market. Consequently, 
the Finnish national treatment undergoes a de minimis test. Next step is to test whether the effect 
on internal market is only minimal so that it merely reduces trade or whether it is severe enough 
so that it has a genuine effect on market access. Here, the question is: what is severe enough a 
restriction? To be able to answer this, a de minimis threshold has to be defined in this context. 
If the threshold is met with the free movement of capital, there is a prima facie infringement of 
Article 63(1) TFEU. The same goes with Article 34 TFEU and the free movement of goods. 
Here, two ideas become significant. The first is Advocate General Darmon’s opinion in Krantz. 
I have previously proposed a method in this thesis that the threshold could be connected to the 
amount of uncertainty present in the factual circumstances and how much of the outcome is up 
to chance. In Krantz, the amount of uncertainty was seen to be as too dominant for either AG 
Darmon himself or the ECJ to even take the case to second test which would have determined 
                                                 
381 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2012, p. 4. 
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the national measure’s compatibility with EU internal market law. I see this uncertainty 
concretized as the amount of ”if”-scenarios taking place in the case. 
The second significant idea is the use of market access test, both with regard to free movement 
of goods and free movement of capital. As the Court delivered its judgment in Krantz long 
before the market access test was introduced, it could not build its reasoning in accordance with 
it. There is, however, no doubt that the outcome could have been different, had it been given at 
the current state of EU law. I do not believe that there would have been a breach of Article 34 
TFEU even then, though. Nevertheless, in “Y GmbH v. Finland”, there might be. 
As I have pointed out previously, it seems obvious that there was a threshold in Krantz, albeit 
quite implicit, in both AG Darmon’s opinion and the Court’s judgment, and the circumstances 
at hand did not meet the threshold. This threshold, which was described as either too remote or 
too uncertain, corresponds with the de minimis thresholds found in the market access test. It is 
the “causality-based” de minimis which has been seen in other judgments of the Court as well.  
There are two ways to see the threshold. The first is to describe it positively as “too many if’s” 
rule. In Krantz, the remoteness and uncertainty were brought about by three if-scenarios, which 
was seen to “cross” the border to the negative side of whether the measure at hand can be a MEE 
or not. In a way, the level of uncertainty can be seen as the amount of if-scenarios. On the other 
hand, the threshold could be described negatively as “the absence of if-scenarios or at least less 
than three of them”. If this negative threshold is then crossed, the second test of the national 
measure’s connections to the effects comes into question. This option seems more well-founded.  
Then again, ”Y GmbH v. Finland” is a fictional case, albeit it is partly based on Krantz. It takes 
place at the current state of EU law and will thus be seen through the doctrine of market access 
test. The same formula which I have found in Krantz – the existence of a causality-based de 
minimis threshold – will be put into test also in this case.  
First, let us consider that this case would be settled complying with the same form of reasoning 
what Darmon used in Krantz. The first question would then be whether there are “perceptible 
effects” on imports brought about by the national provision/provisions in question. After this it 
would be investigated whether the provisions are compatible with the treaty. Krantz failed the 
first test as there were too many uncertainty factors, which was three of them.  
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Could the number of these uncertainties be fewer than three while still enabling the situation of 
the national court assessing the recognition and enforcement of the foreign right to actualize? In 
other words, could there even be a case about recognition of forein proprietary security right 
without all the mentioned uncertainties? On one hand, it can be argued whether the first “if” 
scenario, the effect on foreign traders’ willingness to enter into an agreement with a Finnish 
company, really is a hypotheticality in the first place. This is because of the Court’s recent case 
law concerning capital investments. If this uncertainty is treated as a certainty, the number of 
“if” scenarios is reduced to two. As a consequence, there could, in theory, be grounds for the Y 
GmbH’s claim to succeed and the threshold to be met, depending on the Court’s argumentation. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS: CLARITY TO EXISTING CHAOS OR 
MERELY A JUMP TO A NEW WAR ZONE? 
 
This thesis has dealt with the issue of what could be the EU law related consequences of a 
Statutenwechsel situation taking place between Germany and Finland with regard to a movable 
encumbered asset with a German retention of title clause. My focus has been on the free 
movement provisions concerning goods and capital. While chapter 1 presented the theme and 
research problems, chapter 2 worked as a theoretical premise focusing on private international 
law and the national jurisdictions of the two selected Member States. The contribution of this 
chapter was challenging the criticism that my theme may have encountered in literature, i.e. the 
outcomes presented in the field of private international law. In addition, it set a more concrete 
framework for the further thesis. Chapter 3 and 4, which constitute a whole of a kind, namely 
the first premise of this thesis, went deeper into the European law perspective. First, the literature 
and barely-there case law of the Court with regard to retention of title clauses and the free 
movement of goods were explored, then the free movement of capital. Chapter 5 formed part II 
of the thesis, being a whole as itself: the second premise of this study. Chapters 6 and 7, in turn, 
work as the conclusion of the logical syllogism presented in the beginning. 
As a method, I have invented a fictional case based on a few existing judgments delivered by 
the ECJ and national courts of Finland and Sweden that have somehow concerned national 
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treatment of foreign retention of title clauses. Through this case study, I have been able to 
present a possibility on how the problem of non-recognition and non-enforcement of a retention 
of title clause originating in another Member State might be resolved by the ECJ.  
As a consequence, I have come to the view that the ECJ should clarify its jurisprudence with 
regard to different manifestations of de minimis tests and refrain from presenting contrary 
interpretations and messages to the audience. The obvious interpretation to draw from the 
existing case law and literature seems to be that a hindrance to the internal trade within the scope 
of Article 63 TFEU does not seem to exist in relation to my research questions at the present 
state of the EU. This is because the ECJ has defined the applicable threshold of market access 
test to be on such a high level that in order to reach it, the case cannot fall into any de minimis 
category. Even though some scholars have argued that non-recognition and thus non-
enforcement of foreign retention of title clauses – particularly originating in a “liberal” 
jurisdiction, such as Germany – would constitute an obstacle to internal market, I consider these 
conclusions quite shortsighted and narrow. Namely, a mere hindrance to internal market is not 
sufficient when the situations are deemed through the market access test. This hindrance may 
indeed be too remote, indirect or hypothetical. 
Consequently, I have come up with the following findings. The threshold set for application of 
Article 34 TFEU is likely to be met in a situation similar to my case “Y GmbH vs. Finland”. 
However, the facts of the case have been specifically manipulated, even though they are based 
on real cases – the amount of “if” scenarios or facts has been cut down to two. This means that 
the likelihood for a case exactly like mine to come before the ECJ is very minimal.  
Indeed, if the opinion of AG Darmon in Krantz is taken as a model, there are a few parameters 
that can be changed: the amount of uncertainty-factors. There is proof in case Krantz that three 
of these factors is too much for a causal link to actualize between the national measure and its 
effects on internal market. It can be taken as a fact that three types of de minimis tests exist 
within the jurisprudence of the ECJ at the current state of EU law. Proprietary security rights 
are prone to fall victim to at least one of these, be it the threshold of too minimal effects, the 
hypothetical nature of the case or lack of adequate causality between the measure and the effects 
on trade, the last of which I see as the most significant one. As rules concerning proprietary 
security rights do not concern trade in the narrow sense of the term, they are usually seen to fall 
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for the category of “too uncertain and indirect” rule which is one instance of the causality-based 
de minimis threshold. However, this does not mean that these cases could not succeed the test. 
It merely seems that they would succeed only if the uncertainty factors are cut down to 
minimum. In practice, this would mean that the national provision in question is meant to govern 
trade, one way or another. Furthermore, the effect on trade should not be merely hypothetical 
in a way that it might affect potential traders in other Member States. 
When it comes to the threshold for the free movement of capital, it is indeed true that the Court 
has used the market access test with regard to capital as well. This makes many of the 
conclusions made in the field of free movement of goods at least partly applicable here. 
Moreover, the TFEU Treaty and other official documents do not deny the possibility of 
proprietary security rights constituting a capital movement and thus an object of Article 63 
TFEU. It could even be possible to draw some analogy from the ECJ case law concerning 
foreign investments. Could the outcome in KPN and TPG mean that a case with proprietary 
security rights would meet the threshold and the national non-recognition and non-enforcement 
would be seen as prima facie prohibited measure that needs to be justified? After all, Krantz 
was given when, first, the current Article 63 TFEU was not directly applicable and second, the 
market access test had not yet been used. If Roth’s and von Wilmowsky’s arguments of a 
retention of title constituting a movement of capital are accepted, this case could mean a possible 
obstacle to the free movement of capital.  
Nevertheless, the threshold for infringement for free movement of capital appears not as likely 
to be met – yet. This is because it cannot be said for certain whether the use of retention of title 
actually constitutes a movement of capital. In a way, everything seems to boil down to how the 
term “loan” is defined: if it includes the use of reservation of ownership, the door to Article 63 
TFEU is open. And this, as a matter of interpretation, is an issue for the ECJ to decide.  
 
